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THE FACTIONS WITHIN THE RAGUSAN PATRICIATE
(17th-18th Century)
STJEPAN ΔOSIΔ AND NENAD VEKARIΔ
ABSTRACT: Banished after an alleged love scandal in 1609, Jakov Giorgi
and Jakov Resti conspired with Charles Emmanuel I, duke of Savoy, against
the Ottomans. Shortly after their arrest in Dubrovnik in September 1612, they
were put under trial. Widely supported by the kin, the conspirators won a
political victory over the pragmatic faction of the “Republican loyalists”. A
strong agnatic and political network grouped around the core of the conspira-
tors, and formed a faction called salamankezi (the Salamancanists). This
group became fully articulated in the 17th century, after the aggregation of
the new nobility, and it was to play a dominant role on the Ragusan political
scene over the next century-and-a-half. The inferior position was reserved for
the so-called sorbonezi (the Sorbonnists), who eventually coalesced with the
disdained new nobility. Animosity between the two closed groups continued
well into the 18th century and their unscrupulous struggle for political power
reshaped the traditional pattern of Ragusan political behaviour. 
1. Distinctive class features of the Ragusan patriciate
Ragusan patriciate, an urban trade aristocracy, which emerged in the 12th
century, played the leading role in creating the social and political framework
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of the Ragusan commune in the Middle Ages.1 The first half of the 14th cen-
tury saw the closing of the patrician circle (formally achieved in 1322), in the
context of the strengthening of the commune’s political independence, its
territorial expansion, and governmental consolidation. Old communal insti-
tutions were subject to transformation with the objective to secure the dom-
inant position of this noble stratum, and to give the institutional system an
aristocratic pattern. The political sovereignty, attended in 1358, completed
this process, while specific historical circumstances have to be credited for
the centuries-long experience of this class in ruling the state. The genuine
ideology of the Ragusan state evolved under the influence of the humanist
and renaissance thought, and as such had direct impact on the defining of the
political identity of the Ragusan patriciate as a ruling elite. A myriad of
ancient legends and traditions pertaining to Epidaurum, a nearby settlement
dating from antiquity, served as a historical, legal, and symbolic justification
of their legitimate social position. The rise of the Ragusan patriciate remained
an uncommon phenomenon in the eastern-Adriatic context because the nobility
of other Dalmatian cities under Venetian domination started losing their
political prerogatives. 
In its class ambition to rule, Ragusan patriciate restricted access to all
offices related to decision-making and governing. The organization, jurisdic-
tion, and functioning of the institutional apparatus, councils and offices
developed and adjusted to suit a specific model of aristocratic republicanism
(universitas, corporation), which proved successful in foreign policy and par-
ticularly in the long-standing efforts to maintain internal social stability.
Equality before the law, membership in the Major Council, duty to fulfill
1 A comparison between the social role of the patriciate in medieval Dubrovnik and that of
the Italian city-states of Venice, Genoa, Lucca, or Florence points to a number of similarities in
aristocratic organization. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, however, the differences
gained in prominence. In view of the processes of social differentiation, which in the Italian cities
shifted the focus of social attention away from the nobility, the Ragusan political model did not
experience any radical changes, remaining petrified in its medieval framework until the very last
days of the Republic. Apart from the specific geo-political position, the stability of the aristocrat-
ic rule owed much to the small size of the Republic’s territory and its population. Despite un-
avoidable conflicts which are the subject of this study, the Ragusan patriciate proved capable of
maintaining its class solidarity, controling and directing the political processes. On the crisis of
the nobility of the Italian cities in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries see Claudio Donati,
≈The Italian Nobilities in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries«, in: H. M. Scott (ed.), The
European Nobilities in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, I. London and New York:
Longman, 1995: pp. 237-268.
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offices, hereditary rights through legitimate male offspring, and legalized
endogamy were the hallmarks of the Ragusan nobility.2 Rigid class exclu-
sivism, upon which the patriciate’s solidarity and homogeneity were based,
represented an essential element in maintaining the current social hierarchy,
and subsequently generated a number of problems which resulted in political
instability in the 17th and 18th centuries. But despite the fact, this formal
institutional frame, with minor adjustments, managed to survive until the fall
of the Republic in 1808.3
2. The roots of the rift
Given the role of the patriciate in governing the state, it may rightly be
assumed that the Ragusan policy owed much of its success to class cohesion
and the consensus of the patricians on major political issues. All the political
disagreements and open conflicts which occasionally undermined the noble
elite during the 15th and 16th centuries were resolved within the traditional
pattern of decision-making.4 By the 17th century the patriciate’s unity had
not been seriously threatened, and the decision-making on the councils
exhibited a high degree of consensus.
According to traditional historiography, at the root of the split of the
Ragusan patriciate in the 17th century lay a discriminatory bloodline division
2 The strict endogamous principle was introduced by the law of 1462. Acta Maioris Consilii,
vol. 12, f. 60v (State Archives of Dubrovnik).
3 On the Ragusan patriciate during the Middle Ages see: Konstantin JireËek, Die Romanen in
der Städten Dalmatiens während des Mittelalters. Wien, 1901; Irmgard Mahnken, DubrovaËki
patricijat u XIV veku. [Posebna izdanja Srpske akademije nauka i umetnosti, 340]. Beograd:
SANU, 1960; Josip LuËiÊ, ≈O dubrovaËkom patricijatu u XIV stoljeÊu«. Historijski zbornik 17
(1964): pp. 393-411; Bariπa KrekiÊ, ≈Developed Autonomy: The Patricians in Dubrovnik and
Dalmatian Cities«, in: idem, Urban Society of Eastern Europe in Premodern Times. Los Angeles,
Berkley: University of California Press, 1978: pp. 185-215; Bariπa KrekiÊ, ≈O problemu koncen-
tracije vlasti u Dubrovniku u XIV i XV vijeku«. Zbornik radova Vizantoloπkog instituta 24-25
(1986): pp. 397-406; Zdenka JanekoviÊ-Römer, Okvir slobode: DubrovaËka vlastela izmeu
srednjovjekovlja i humanizma. Zagreb-Dubrovnik: Zavod za povijesne znanosti HAZU, 1999.
4 Political collaboration of certain Ragusan nobles with foreign rulers had always been a
threat and a challenge to the patriciate’s unity. The well-known conspiracy of the Bucignolo
brothers from 1532, as well as the intelligence activity of Marin Zamagna (1480-1548) and Fra-
no Luccari (1541-1598) on behalf of the Habsburgs of Austria and Spain proved a trifle in com-
parison with the political split caused by the stirring events of the Great Conspiracy. Cf. Josip
Æontar, ObveπËevalna sluæba in diplomacija austrijskih Habsburæanov v boju proti Turkom v 16.
stoletju. Ljubljana: Slovenska akademija znanosti in umetnosti, 1973: pp. 13-46, 57-95, 103-107;
Jorjo TadiÊ, DubrovaËki portreti. Beograd: Srpska knjiæevna zadruga, 1948: pp. 9-52; 281-315.
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among the patricians, which developed after the ennoblement of ten wealthy
merchant families The criterion which at that time largely determined the
shaping of the two rival agnatic groups was closely connected to their atti-
tude towards the new nobility. Some noble families (or casate of certain fam-
ilies) refused any form of amalgamation with the recently ennobled families,
while the others found no obstacle to establish marital or affinal ties with the
aggregates. The consequences of this agnatically based conflict had become
increasingly visible in the mid-18th century, when it became more than
apparent that the traditional mechanism of decision-making on the councils
no longer functioned. The inner-class consensualism gave way to an open
conflict between the two rival groups. The agnatic division marked the polit-
ical behaviour, perpetuating the crisis of the patriciate. The old nobility stub-
bornly refused to acknowledge marriage ties with the new nobles, holding
the latter inferior in rank, while a number of patrician houses accepted the
new nobles and amalgamated with them. The sources from the 1760s refer to
the first group as salamankezi (the Salamancanists), and to the opposed
group as sorbonezi (the Sorbonnists).5
The “blood” rift was, however, only a biological frame of the political
conflict which dated back about 50 years before the period of aggregation.
Admittedly, the patrician solidarity was subject to irreparable instability by
the beginning of the 17th century. This period of intense political ferment
marked a turning-point in the relations between the patrician families, and
with it, in the entire political practice. The conflict reached a climax in
1611/12 with an event known in historiography as the Great Conspiracy.6 A
5 A most thorough analysis of the patrician rift after the aggregation and the emergence of the
factions of the Sorbonnists and the Salamancanists has been provided by Æarko MuljaËiÊ. See his
works: ≈O strankama u starom Dubrovniku«. Anali Historijskog instituta JAZU u Dubrovniku 6-7
(1959): pp. 25-40; ≈Salamankezi i sorbonezi u Dubrovniku«. Filologija 2 (1959): pp. 161-173;
≈Istraga protiv jakobinaca 1797. god. u Dubrovniku«. Anali Historijskog instituta JAZU u Dubrov-
niku 2 (1953): pp. 235-252.
6 The study of the Great Conspiracy in this article is based on the published sources and the
extensive literature available. Relevant Ragusan documents pertaining to the events involving the
plot have been edited in: DubrovaËka akta i povelje, III.1, ed. Jovan RadoniÊ. [Zbornik za istori-
ju, jezik i knjiæevnost srpskog naroda, IX]. Beograd: Srpska kraljevska akademija, 1939: pp. 182-
321. Venetian documents on the issue are edited by ©ime LjubiÊ, ≈O odnoπajih medju repub-
likom MletaËkom i DubrovaËkom od poËetka XVI. stoljeÊa do njihove propasti« Rad JAZU 53
(1880): pp. 137-151. For the conspiracy, see the following pivotal works: Dragoljub PavloviÊ,
≈Stijepo –oriÊ (–ureviÊ)«, in: idem, Iz knjiæevne i kulturne istorije Dubrovnika. Sarajevo:
Svjetlost, 1955: pp. 60-68; Radovan SamardæiÊ, Veliki vek Dubrovnika. Beograd: Prosveta, 1983:
pp. 44-61; Vinko ForetiÊ, Povijest Dubrovnika, II. Zagreb: Nakladni zavod Matice hrvatske, 1980:
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crisis which practically paralyzed the complete institutional apparatus was
caused by a group of nobles who were set on involving the Republic in war
campaigns by the counter-Ottoman coalition to restore European territories
occupied by the Ottoman Empire. The Great Conspiracy may be viewed as
reverberations of the European political concept of orientalism, with the east-
ern policy as the main issue.7 The dawn of the 17th century saw the first
Ottoman defeats, giving rise to a host of political plans by the counter-
Ottoman coalition, which were to determine permanently the relations
between the Western Christendom and the weakened East. However, the
coalition of the interested states and rulers proved provisional and they failed
to establish stable political relations. The Habsburgs of Spain and Austria,
Pope Clement VIII, the Spanish governors of Naples and their Italian min-
ions featured as leading actors in all the phases of the expansionist campaign.
The movement was profoundly imbued with the ideas of the Catholic
Counter-Reformation. In view of the Slavs under the Ottoman rule, it was
particularly marked with the papal policy and the influence of the Jesuit
order.
pp. 74-78. Despite substantial factual information, older authors failed to discern the political and
class repercussions of the Conspiracy. In this respect Zdenko Zlatar has made a much-needed
contribution. See: Zdenko Zlatar, Our Kingdom Come: The Counter-Reformation, The Republic
of Dubrovnik, and the Liberation of the Balkan Slavs. New York: Boulder, Columbia University
Press, 1992; Zdenko Zlatar, Between the Double Eagle and the Crescent. The Republic of
Dubrovnik and the Origins of the Eastern Question. New York: Boulder, Columbia University
Press, 1992. Viewing the Conspiracy as a political turning-point, Zlatar tended to analyze its
international political dimension. Founding his interpretation on the conflict between a “pro-
Ottoman” and a “counter-Ottoman” faction, he overaccentuated the influence of the broader
Counter-Reformation context, the Vatican policy, and the impact of the European Catholic states
on the political affairs amongst the Ragusan patriciate. Having taken into consideration Zlatar’s
results, we have here examined the Conspiracy as an embrio of the patrician conflict. We have
supported it with an analysis of the agnatically based political structure of the patriciate. In this
respect, a specific agnatic and political dynamics developed after the Conspiracy, which most
directly influenced the deepening and the continuity of the rift.
7 In conformity with anthropological assumptions of William Said on the understanding of
the eastern, primarily Ottoman civilization from the western standpoint, this period is of particu-
lar importance. It was then that an all-embracing ideological vision of the Orient as a profoundly
different and hostile religion and civilization became widespread throughout Europe. Historical-
ly, western orientalism represents an interrelationship in which the Christian West “defined” the
East. On the other hand, western perspective was determined by a self-reflective construction of
its own civilization. Thus, in modern history western orientalism played an essential role in
defining the idea of Europe and its identity. Cf. William Said, Orijentalizam. Zagreb: Konzor,
2000. 
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3. The Great Conspiracy
With the end of the long, drawn-out war between the Habsburgs and the
Turks (1593-1606), Spain and Austria temporarily restrained from further
actions, and the newly ordained pope, Paul V, failed to resume the policy of his
predecessor. Duke Charles Emmanuel I of Savoy was the leading figure of the
counter-Ottoman campaign in Spain. In the course of 1607 he intensified the
intelligence activity, the aim of which was to launch an invasion on the eastern
Adriatic coast from where the reconquista was to spread towards the Balkan
mainland. It is quite understandable that Charles Emmanuel I included the terri-
tory of the Republic into his strategic schemes. The ports of Dubrovnik and Mali
Ston were to serve as bridgeheads and logistic bases for the supply of the rebels.8
True, the political atmosphere in Dubrovnik may have seemed predis-
posed towards the realization of the aforementioned scheme. Western powers
turned Dubrovnik into one of the most significant intelligence centers. A suc-
cessful formula the Ragusans had worked out long before in establishing
pragmatic co-existence with the Porte gave way to an alternative, in the form
of an ideology which advocated risky campaigns in the East. Counter-Otto-
man initiatives in Europe, with their political and religious elements, influ-
enced the appearance of genuine panslavism, permeated with Catholic pro-
selytism among the Ragusan nobility and the educated citizen elite.9 The Jesuits,
8 According to the dispatches received between 1608 and 1611, the Senate’s anxiety was
well-grounded. From the information the Senate gathered, the initial phase of the counter-
Ottoman campaign involved the pope, the King of Spain, Archduke of Austria, and Duke of
Savoy. The attack was to be launched from the direction of the Albanian coast, across the lands
of the Austrian Archduke (across Croatia most likely) and the territory of Dubrovnik, from where
the allied troops were to invade Herzegovina. DubrovaËka akta i povelje: pp. 273-278.
9 Jakov Resti himself testified on the religious, proselyte motives of the conspirators. The lat-
ter, namely, hoped that the Orthodox, “Rasciani”, who considerably outnumbered the Turks,
would adopt Catholicism. DubrovaËka akta i povelje: p. 318; Z. Zlatar, Our Kingdom Come: pp.
303- 304. Yet the religious element of the Conspiracy was not single-sided. It was the famous
Benedictine Mavro Orbini, author of Il Regno degli Slavi, the work in which he promoted the
“ideology” of panslavism in the spirit of the Counter-Reformation, that in the very first days of
the Conspiracy, denounced to the authorities fra Santo, a layman from Mljet, who was a mas-
sanger and one of the first confidants of the Savoy duke in Dubrovnik (DubrovaËka akta i pove-
lje: pp. 190-192, 300-302). On the other hand, Orbini’s influence on the bishop of Ston, Miho
Resti, with whom he started collaborating in 1610, at the time of the Conspiracy, is still shrouded
in obscurity. The Senate’s decision of November 1610, by which Orbini was banished from
Ston and its bishopry, is more than indicative because the bishop himself took active part in the
Conspiracy. Orbini’s death in November of 1610 provides plenty of ground for speculation on his
role in the whole affair.
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too, contributed to the scene, their newly established Ragusan society being
led by Aleksandar KomuloviÊ between 1604 and 1608. Thus it should not
come as a surprise that a group of the Ragusan patricians consorted with
Charles Emmanuel, seeing in his plan a chance for the Ragusan territorial and
political expansion, but also their personal promotion. The contacts between
the Savoy court and the rulers of Herzegovina, Montenegro, Albania, and the
representatives of the Catholic and the Orthodox Church generally took place
somewhere on the Dubrovnik estate, and the Senate was certainly not un-
aware of the affairs. Savoy’s intelligence network involved a number of Ragu-
sans from the very beginning of the political activities. Among the first and
by far most trusted men siding with Charles Emmanuel was a distinguished
and highly influential patrician Marin Resti. He headed the patrician group
which supported radical changes of the current Ragusan policy and its active
participation in the counter-Ottoman campaigns. He was soon joined by his
brothers, Lucijan and Ivan Resti, and Jakov Resti (*1578), a relative of his and
a particularly trusted confidant. The latter enjoyed the support of his brothers
Miho, bishop of Ston, Petar-Andrija and Mato Resti. The members of the Resti
family were subsequently joined by Jakov Giorgi (*1575) and his brothers,
Stjepan, and Marin, although they did not take direct part in the Conspiracy.
The Resti-Giorgi clan multiplied, as a considerable number of kin and mem-
bers of other families, such as Sabo Menze, Marin Cerva, and Jakov Luccari,
together with several citizens and clerics, grouped around them.
Counting on the rebels’ support, the ultimate goal of Charles Emmanuel was
to occupy as much Ottoman territory in the European part of the Empire as pos-
sible. Claiming diverse medieval dynastic traditions, he intended to crown him-
self King of Rumelia, although the historical identity of this “Kingdom” was
dubious and its territory vague. By the end of 1607 the confidants of the Savoy
Duke visited the island of Mljet and Dubrovnik, with intent to present the rebel
leaders with financial support and acquire affiliates among the Ragusan patri-
cians. Imberto Saluzzio, known as commendator della Manta, and Filiberto
Provona, under the guise of horse tradesmen, took full advantage of the visit to
instruct the rebels and draw precise charts of the City fortifications.10 But Joan-
10 The proof of Della Manta and Provona’s earnest efforts to accomplish their mission are the
two most precisely charted planimetric maps of the city and the fortifications, along with a draw-
ing of the Dubrovnik port. The maps are filed at the State Archives in Turin. They have been
published by Ilario Principe, who successfully established their date but failed to offer any his-
torical background. Ilario Principe, ≈Tri neobjavljene karte Dubrovnika iz XVI.-XVII. st.«.
Dubrovnik N.S. 2/1 (1991): pp. 191-202. Cf. Z. Zlatar, Our Kingdom Come: p. 272.
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nes Renesi, another of Duke’s confidants, assigned to inspect the territory in
the hinterland, harboured serious doubts as to whether the leaders of various
rebel groups he had contacted were able to stand up to the Ottomans.
Convinced that the majority of the population had no desire to “replace the
Ottoman tyranny with the Spanish rule”, Renesi reported euphemistically
that the campaign rests upon “very shaky ground”.11 This report had a most
discouraging effect upon the Duke who almost gave up on the idea. 
The conspiring episode in Dubrovnik history may well have had a differ-
ent course if, in April 1609, Jakov Giorgi and Jakov Resti had not been ban-
ished from the Republic. When a notable and wealthy citizen Dinko Facenda
denounced Giorgi and Resti before the Senate for having committed adultery
with his wife, the two accused, accompanied by a couple of friends, beat the
man to death. The fact that they were sentenced to a twenty-year exile no
doubt helped Resti and Giorgi side with the Duke for good, finding shelter at
his court in Turin. Living a life of wealth and privilege, Giorgi and Resti,
together with Marin Resti who, because of his collaboration with the Duke
had been banished from the Republic somewhat later, resumed the prepara-
tions for the invasion across the Ragusan territory. Meanwhile, they tried to
put pressure on the Senate with a series of pardon pleas. By the end of 1609
they were to undertake a secret mission in Konavle where they met with the
affiliates from Montenegro, Boka (the Bay of Kotor), and Albania. Their per-
sistence was finally rewarded. Perhaps in hope of soothing the matter, which
was becoming a serious menace to the Republic, the Senate eventually par-
doned them by the end of 1610, after a series of rejections.12 The conspira-
tors, however, did not abandon their mission, but remained in Italy, ready to
carry out their plan. Meanwhile, Charles Emmanuel completely withdrew
from the action, the leadership being readily accepted by Vicenzo I Gonzaga,
duke of Mantua. The court of Mantua offered hospitality to the Ragusan con-
spirators, still working together for a common end. 
In August 1611, a carelessly and hastily planned invasion started when
Flemish, a warship of the Mantuan duke, armed with 42 cannons and carry-
ing 300 crew, sailed into the waters of Dubrovnik. Purchased in the Nether-
lands, the vessel was laden with various kinds of weapons and ammunition
11 Z. Zlatar, Our Kingdom Come: pp. 271-276.
12 Acta Consilii Rogatorum, vol. 82, ff. 205v, 207v (SAD). 
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for the rebels, ready for the eventual occupation of two strategic posts with-
in Ragusan territory (Ston and Molunat). Jakov Resti, Jakov Giorgi, and an
ex-layman of the Benedictines of Mljet, friar Santo, were on board. Marin
Resti was supposed to be in charge of the mainland operation. After he had
met in Slano with his brothers Ivan and Miho, and his nephew, Marin Sorgo,
at the time count of Slano, Marin Resti boarded the vessel in the Peljeπac
Channel and set off southwards where he was to meet the rebel leaders and
inform them about the oncoming Spanish invasion of the Bay of Kotor. At
the beginning of September, Jakov Giorgi and Jakov Resti secretly disem-
barked in order to meet with their kin and partisans. 
The Senate was excellently informed on the conspirators’ whereabouts
and their intentions.13 Guided by safety precautions, the Senate recurrently
increased the number of guards posted on the walls and fortifications of Ston
and Dubrovnik. Venice, too, was informed about the presence of the Mantuan
warship, for the Venetians were strongly against counter-Ottoman actions
under Spanish patronage. While Resti and Giorgi were off board, the Venetian
fleet attacked their vessel. This incident forced the Mantuan warship to leave
the Ragusan territorial waters before any information from the rebel leaders
was received. The plan thus failed. Resti and Giorgi were soon apprehended
and cast into prison. September 5, 1611, marked the beginning of a trial
which further deepened the rift within the Ragusan patriciate.
Zdenko Zlatar bases his interpretation of the conflict on the “pro-Ottoman”
and “counter-Ottoman” political polarization of the two patrician factions. But,
in our opinion, a mere ideological element, i.e., “pro-Ottoman” and “counter-
Ottoman” component of the conflict would be insufficient to stir such a
large-scale division among the patriciate. The actions of the Ragusan govern-
ment in following up with the Conspiracy prove that a decisive majority of
the senators were convinced that an open counter-Ottoman policy in the
existing power balance would harm the Republic, and would certainly threaten
13 The Senate undertook a full investigation into the conspirators’ activities. Apart from the
interrogation of the witnesses with whom they contacted, the government was directly informed
about the conspirators’ schemes from their headquarters in Turin. The Ragusan spy at the court
of the Duke of Savoy was Franjo Biondi of Hvar, who kept the Senate regularly posted on all the
plans conceived within the counter-Ottoman coalition. Curiously, Biondi states that the plot
enjoys full support of France and Holland with an aim to disqualify Dubrovnik from the trade
and shipping competition. V. ForetiÊ, Povijest Dubrovnika II: p. 76.
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its welfare. A pragmatic view on the issue did not a priori imply pro-Ottoman
policy. Merely, the majority of the patricians played wisely and supported a
political status quo in the Ottoman relations, but this tactical position was far
from any sort of active support to the Ottomans. Thus determining the group
which demanded the capital punishment for the conspirators as “pro-
Ottoman” is neither accurate nor appropriate. Rather, in the Great Conspiracy
context, they may be distinguished as the “Republican loyalists”, and in a
wider perspective—a “pragmatic” political faction. 
The principally unanimous pragmatic attitude towards the possible danger
of involving the Republic into a war conflict gradually lost in significance
when the conspirators were to be sentenced. But, the agnatic moment proved
to be the essential source of division: the patricians disagreed on the charac-
ter and form of the punishment for the crime the conspirators had committed.
That is why the hearings of the suspected had been postponed for almost a
month. Although the course of the investigation revealed a plan according to
which certain parts of the Ragusan territory were to be occupied, it remained
unclear as to whether the conspirators attempted to mount a coup in the
Republic. On October 11, by a vote of 22 for and 16 against, the Senate
decided to put the accused to torture and elicit the confession of the
Conspiracy. But the defendant’s bravery during torture and their refusal to
confess further complicated the passing of the sentence. Giorgi and Resti
admitted to their political proselyte motives in taking part in the foreactions
of the Christian armada assigned to launch the invasion and, with the rebel
support, it was to liberate “Albania and Serbia” of the “heathens”. They
claimed that the welfare of the country was their only guidance, for an advan-
tageous victory would not only mean an expansion of the Catholicism in the
broader Dubrovnik hinterland, but also the Republic’s relief from the bur-
densome tribute and the lasting Ottoman menace. Lastly, they believed that
the Western rulers would consent to the territorial expansion of the Dubrov-
nik state.14
The discussion on the sentence issue took place within the frames of
agnatic groupings on the Senate and on the Major Council. The events which
followed prove that the animosities between the families developed from the
14 Z. Zlatar, Our Kingdom Come: pp. 303-306.
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personal feuds of certain members of patrician families and casate.15 After an
elaborate investigation and questioning of the accused and their kin, as well
as all those believed to have some direct or indirect knowledge about the
Conspiracy, on November 10, 1611, with the majority of 29 votes to 11, the
Senate passed the guilty verdict. The decision about punishing or not, how-
ever, narrowed the votes to 26 in favour and 14 opposed. The patricians
finally split over the decision on capital punishment which could not have
been voted out because the vote ratio was 20 to 20. Namely, twenty senators
voted for life imprisonment as an alternative sentence.16 This issue definitely
split the Senate and other patricians into two irreconcilable factions. The
defendant’s kin and friends, on the verge of military revolt, refused to accept
the drastic sentence, while those in favour of the death penalty considered it
the right decision when high treason was in question. Those in favour of the
capital punishment were headed by the senators Marko Bassegli and Jero
Ghetaldi, whereas their opponents, flocked around the notable Vladislav
Menze, who argued vehemently for a mitigated sentence and against death.
As a result, voting 28 for and 12 against, it was decided that Resti and Giorgi
were to be imprisoned in the dungeon within the Rector’s Palace under
extremely harsh conditions. In order to secure the normal functioning of the
councils and prevent the patriciate’s open conflict, the Senate decreed a series
of very strict measures against disorderly conduct. In addition, a committee of
five members was appointed to investigate the case and report on all the
occurrences related to the Conspiracy.17
The fact that the master mind of the Conspiracy, Marin Resti, was still at
large and had not given up on the idea of invasion warmed up the tensions.
On the other hand, the Ottomans were likely to lose confidence in the Repub-
lic. In the midst of the controversy, in February 1612, Vladislav Menze, the
conspirators’ most authoritative advocate, was elected rector. By the close of
the month, probably in the night of February 23, while the rector and his fam-
15 A long-drawn-out feud characterized the relationship between the head prosecutor, Marko
Bassegli, and the conspirators’ defence counsel, Vladislav Menze. (Cf. Z. Zlatar, Our Kingdom
Come: pp. 309-310). Their animosity evolved into an open political conflict, and is an illustrative
example of the complex dynamics of the development of factions. Controversial political po-
sitions do appear suggestive and well-grounded in the international political context, but in the
patrician groupings on the Republic councils, they reveal a latent agnatic and clan dimension.
16 DubrovaËka akta i povelje: pp. 263-264.
17 DubrovaËka akta i povelje: pp. 264-269.
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ily were attending a carnival party outside the Rector’s Palace, unexpected
events took course.18 The prisoners managed to break through the ceiling of the
cell, escape through the rector’s premises and across the city walls, and reach
the port where Miho Resti, bishop of Ston, was awaiting in a boat. The fugitives
set off towards KorËula and Hvar, and then Italy. As the escape remained
undetected until the following morning, it was quite clear that the rector him-
self must have been one of the accomplices, together with the prisoners’ fully
supportive kin. The rector’s guilt, however, could not be established. The
successful escape contributed to the lessening of the tensions in the councils,
for the conspirators were sentenced in absence, and the execution of the capital
penalty was ruled out of order.19
Yet the conflict between the factions was again intensified with the arrest
of the brothers and kin of the two fugitives. A tactful approach of Vladislav
Menze helped him not only avoid the eventual negative consequences due to
his role in the Resti-Giorgi affair, but he also managed to win the support of
the Senate and to be elected to the influential office of the proveditori.20 The
conspirators’ kin, however, could not escape the punishment. The brother of
Jakov Resti, Petar-Andrija, was sentenced to eight years of banishment and
was forbidden permanent residence in the states under the rule of the Austrian
archduke and the dukes of Mantua and Savoy. Highly positioned in the Church
hierarchy, Jakov’s second brother Miho, bishop of Ston, was sentenced in
absence to a two-year exile on the islet of St. Andrew, while the third brother,
Mato, was only reproached. Lucijan, brother of Marin Resti, was sentenced
to four years of banishment under the same conditions as Petar-Andrija Resti.
18 The Senate records and documents related to the Conspiracy do not contain the exact date
of the escape. The fact that the first discussion on it took place on March 4 led most authors to
speculate on it being March 3. The latter date is also cited by Z. Zlatar (Between the Double
Eagle and the Crescent: p. 100). February 23, 1612, however, would appear a more likely date, a
reference of which was also made in the Venetian report and on which Zlatar decided in one of
his later books (Our Kingdom Come: p. 310). Namely, Vladislav Menze, suspected of collaborating
with the conspirators, held his rectorship in February and not in March.
19 On March 4, 1612, the Senate voted in favour of death sentence for all those concealing
any information on the conspirators, a price of 3,000 ducats being set on their heads. DubrovaË-
ka akta i povelje: pp. 278-280. 
20 Z. Zlatar, Our Kingdom Come: p. 312. The fact that after the escape Rafael Bona, Resti’s
uncle, was elected rector for March testifies of the gradual predominance of the pro-conspiratorial
faction.
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The same sentence was passed onto Stjepan Giorgi, brother of Jakov Giorgi,
while the third brother, Mato, was acquitted, and so were Resti’s cousins,
Marin Gradi and Marin Bobali.21
Although the counter-Ottoman plans lost greatly in significance with the
death of the Mantuan Duke Vincenzo in February 1612 and the succession
of Emperor Rudolph at the Habsburg throne, the conflict caused by the Great
Conspiracy perpetuated into a deep agnatic and political rift within the patri-
ciate.
4. The deepening of the rift after the Great Conspiracy
As during the investigation into the Conspiracy the Senate acted unani-
mously, the Ragusan sources tended to present the political motives of the
Resti-Giorgi group as being exclusively treasonal, that is, contrary to the
interests of the state. But the testimonies of the conspirators, the result of the
conspiracy, and the rift it caused within the patriciate point to a significantly
different and multifaceted social and political context in which the “treason”
may be interpreted as a legitimate and patriotic act. The version which pre-
vailed in the contemporary documents was actually a politically contextual-
ized version of the rival faction. However, in the political sense, the future
gradually affirmed the conspiring group.
After the escape of the conspirators in February 1612, Marin Resti ap-
peared to be the most common cause of the Republic’s headaches. Archduke
Charles Habsburg, who had started the war against Venice, appointed Resti
commander in Senj. In May 1612, taking advantage of the Veneto-Habsburg
conflict, Resti attacked parts of Peljeπac and Primorje with 400 Uskoks, rav-
aging and plundering the estates of his opponents, and attempting in vain to
invade Ston.22 The crisis contributed to the consolidation of Bassegli’s prag-
matic faction, which advocated additional measures of surveillance and
defense of the Republic borders. The international scene was equally tense
due to the Veneto-Spanish conflict in the Adriatic, triggered by the Vice-
King of Naples, Pedro Ossuna. The latter combined his hostility towards
Venice with the current counter-Ottoman campaign which was still support-
21 DubrovaËka akta i povelje: pp. 282-284. Marin Resti, Jakov Resti, Jakov Giorgi, and Miho
Resti, bishop of Ston, remained in exile until death.
22 V. ForetiÊ, Povijest Dubrovnika II: p. 76; Z. Zlatar, Our Kingdom Come: p. 314.
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ed by the Duke of Savoy and the Habsburg Archduke. Furthermore, it was
the Kingdom of Naples that offered protection to Jakov Resti and Jakov
Giorgi, while Bishop Miho Resti was supported by the pope himself. With
the intrusion of the Spanish fleet into the Adriatic in the spring of 1617, the
Republic found itself in an unpleasant political situation. Namely, the
Spanish vessels sailed into the port of Gruæ on several occasions, and the
Republic helped Ossuna in various ways on account of the former alliance
between the two states. The Ottomans accused the Senate for open collabo-
ration with Spain and the Venetian fleet threatened to blockade the city and
attack it. Thanks to a masterly diplomatic manoeuvre, in which the Ragusans
provided all the parties with the intelligence they required, the Republic man-
aged to escape more serious consequences. As will be witnessed again on a
number of occasions, problems concerning the foreign affairs partly over-
shadowed and slowed down the inner-class conflicts. During the Veneto-
Spanish conflicts in the Adriatic (1617-1619), Venetian reports advert to
three factions within the Ragusan patriciate: the pro-Spanish, the pro-
Venetian, and the strongest, pro-Ottoman faction.23 This denomination
should, of course, be taken with reserve and primarily as proof of the con-
tinuation of the patriciate’s agnatic and political grouping.
The conflict in the Adriatic ended with the Spanish retreat in 1620. With
the close of the first epoch of most intense counter-Ottoman actions initiated
by the Western powers, the activities of the banished Ragusan conspirators
considerably lost in broader political significance. Both factions originating
from the period of the Conspiracy share credit for the Republic’s survival of
the crisis. Thanks to the pragmatic faction, Dubrovnik managed to regain the
necessary favourable position with the Ottomans, whereas the conspirators’
faction remained loyal to Spain. 
It seems that the clear-cut distinction of the two groups was a long-run-
ning process. The rift within the patriciate after the Conspiracy is more than
apparent, yet makes Zlatar’s model, according to which the main motive of
division is the continuous conflict between the two opposed groups with the
23 In the midst of Venice’s conflict with the Vice-king of Naples in 1612, a so-called “Spanish
plot” was disclosed among the Venetian patriciate. If the coup d’etat had succeeded, the Venetian
policy would be completely subjected to the Spanish counter-Ottoman plans in the Balkans. Cf.
Vuk Vinaver, ≈Turska i Dubrovnik u doba πpanske invazije Jadranskog mora (1617-1619 go-
dine)«. Istorijski glasnik 4/1 (1952): pp. 21-59; Z. Zlatar, Our Kingdom Come: pp. 314-324.
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strong “pro- and counter-Ottoman” ideological positions, hardly acceptable.
Namely, the political position of the Republic in view of the Ottomans,
Venetians, and the Habsburgs during the Candian War (1645-1669), post-
earthquake crisis (1667), and the Vienna War (1683-1699) experienced unex-
pected changes. Ideological differences among the patricians are hardly
traceable from the sources, as provisional political pragmatism prevailed,
and all the political efforts were subjected to the struggle for the Republic’s
well-being. 
Genealogical analysis of the rift in the first half of the 17th century pro-
vides a more accurate interpretation, assuming that the polarization of the
two political factions took place gradually, according to the double key: on
the basis of agnatic ties and following the political situation. The develop-
ment of the patrician rift thus features as a complex diachronic process which
we shall analyze on both the genealogical level and that of the political com-
petition for the monopolization of institutional power. As the official sources
provide little reliable data on the further development of the division along
the political and ideological lines, a comprehensive genealogical reconstruc-
tion will reveal a most distinct pattern of the rift. 
5. Marginalization of the defeated faction, illustrated on the career of
Ivan GunduliÊ
A one-sided and oversimplified interpretation of the patrician conflict as
in Zlatar’s pro- and counter-Ottoman model in the analysis of the later course
of the class rift calls for considerable intervention. In this respect, our atten-
tion should be drawn to a casata, the member of which was Ivan GunduliÊ
(1589-1638), the poet. Namely, the latter’s father and uncle, Frano and Toma
Gondola, during the conspiracy trial sided with the “Republican loyalists”,
who were headed by Marko Bassegli. Their cousin, Jero Gondola (Table 1),
however, was recruited by the conspirators’ faction, i.e., “counter-Ottoman”
group under the lead of Vladislav Menze.24 Therefore, the Gondola family
split during the Great Conspiracy. Genealogical analysis of the poet’s des-
24 Jero Gondola, son of Frano, was one of the tutors that Frano Gondola had authorized in
1592 to run the estate of the three-year-old Ivan GunduliÊ. –uro Körbler mistook Jero Gondola
for another Jero, son of Ivan and poet’s other uncle to whom Suze sina razmetnoga were dedicated.
Cf. Djela –iva Frana GunduliÊa, ed. –uro Körbler. [Stari pisci hrvatski, 9]. Zagreb: JAZU,
1919: p. III.
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cendants during and after the aggregation of the new nobility confirms that
his casata belonged to the Sorbonnist group of the Ragusan patriciate. With
his wife Nika, daughter of ©iπko Sorgo (†1644), GunduliÊ had three sons.
The eldest, Frano (1630-1700), marshal and chamberlain at the court of
Leopold of Habsburg, disregarded the strict endogamous rules and in 1674
married a foreigner, Countess Octavia Margarita Strozzi, having no heirs in
Dubrovnik.25 The youngest, Mato (1636-1684), spent several years in the
military service of the Spanish Habsburgs, too. After his return to Dubrovnik,
Mato married a nonnoble, but had no children. In 1668, ©iπko (1633-1682),
GunduliÊ’s second son, also remarried a commoner from a distinguished
citizen family, Kata Nale, which fully confirms his Sorbonnist affiliation.26
During the life of Ivan GunduliÊ and his sons, their casata was still rather
highly-positioned on the political scene. Both Mato and ©iπko Gondola had
been elected rectors of the Republic, and interestingly, both of them died
while holding the office. But with ©iπko’s descendants, Ivan (1678-1721)
and ©iπko (1682-1758), the situation proved quite different.27 There is a striking
relationship between their Sorbonnist identity and their unsuccessful political
career. In the 18th century and until its extinction, the Gondola family occupied
the bottom position on the ladder of political offices, being ranked even
below the new noble families (Tables 12 and 13).
An open question remains: was the political marginalization of the Sor-
bonnist Gondola family influenced by the ideological elements of the poetic
works of Ivan GunduliÊ, particularly Dubravka and Osman? The history of
literature systematically examines GunduliÊ’s complex opus, especially in
terms of its poetic structure, form, and composition, comparing it with the
25 On military service of Frano and Mato Gondola see: Mirko DeanoviÊ, ≈Frano Dæiva Gun-
duliÊa i njegov put u Moskvu«. Starine 41 (1948): pp. 7-59. In the absence of parish registers, we
have not been able to establish the data on the marriage of Mato Gondola. One of Frano’s letters
reveals that he too, following ©iπko’s example, was married to a nonnoble. (M. DeanoviÊ, ≈Fra-
no Dæiva GunduliÊa«: p. 12).
26 The Nale (NaljeπkoviÊ) family was never admitted into the Ragusan patriciate, as erro-
neously concluded by –uro Körbler (Djela –iva Frana GunduliÊa: p. XI). Similar to their brother
Frano, who married a foreigner, Mato and ©iπko Gondola took advantage of the provisional deci-
sions on the liberalization of marriage.
27 Following the established inner-class endogamy, the poets’s grandsons, Ivan and ©iπko
Gondola, married two Sorbonnist brides: Lukrecija Bona and Ore Ghetaldi. In 1697, their sister,
Nika, also married a Sorbonnist, Petar Sorgo, and her grandson by the name of Petar Sorgo is
credited for having revised GunduliÊ’s Osman. 
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Table 1. Factions in the Great Conspiracy of 1610/12 by senatorship
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work or his predecessors and contemporaries. The biographical data on Gun-
duliÊ are commonly studied within the political framework of the period of
the Catholic Counter-Reformation and the crisis of the Ragusan society at the
dawn of the 17th century. On the other hand, historiographic interpretations
of the political and social conditions prevailing in the GunduliÊ’s Dubrovnik
rarely make use of the semantic diversity of his works. In historiographic
analysis, the correlation between the narrative and allegorical layers of Gun-
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Source: Z. Zlatar, Our Kingdom Come: pp. 341-343, 345-349.
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Ivan GunduliÊ became member of the Major Council in 1608 and eyewit-
nessed the stirring events of the Conspiracy and the rift which followed. It is
quite understandable that GunduliÊ would comment on the political events
and processes he witnessed from his own aesthetical and poetical view. Thus
his works may also be interpreted in the context of the rift within the Ragusan
patriciate. Some literary historians point to a number of GunduliÊ’s versed
allusions to the conspirators, the “betrayal of freedom” and the “domestic
battle”.28 In his historiographic reinterpretation of Dubravka, Zdenko Zlatar
rejected some previous misconceptions and provided most solid explanation
of its key political background.29 Dubravka is a poetical and allegorical drama
about the freedom of Dubrovnik. Based on ancient mythological elements,
the drama is wrapped in the form of a pastoral, by means of which he found
it most appropriate to personify the Golden Age, the mythic state of un-
disturbed civic harmony. By glorifying the Golden Age of Dubrava as opposed
to the menacing events, GunduliÊ resorts to allegory in order to describe the
evolution of the patrician disunity and class disharmony. The genuine value
of the Ragusan freedom, founded on the patrician rule, manifests when
Dubrava is threatened by the powers of evil behind the scene. Decoded pol-
itically, Dubravka, among other things, tells the story of the patrician rift.
28 This particularly refers to Vsevolod Setschkareff, Milan RatkoviÊ, Miroslav PantiÊ, and
Slobodan Prosperov Novak. Cf. Vsevolod Setschkareff, Die Dichtungen GunduliÊ’s und ihr po-
etischer Stil. Bonn: Athenaeum-Verlag, 1952; Ivan GunduliÊ, Osman, ed. Milan RatkoviÊ. Za-
greb: Zora, 1955; Dæivo GunduliÊ, Izabrana dela, ed. Miroslav PantiÊ. Beograd, 1964. Slobodan
Prosperov Novak provides a new and complex interpretation of the typically Ragusan political
ideological level in GunduliÊ’s works. Slobodan Prosperov Novak, Povijest hrvatske knjiæevnos-
ti, III. Zagreb: Antibarbarus, 1999: pp. 226-277.
29 Zlatar argued against Jakπa RavliÊ’s thesis on Dubravka, naively constructed in the manner
of dialectal materialism, as an allegory of class conflict, reflecting the struggle between the rising
“bourgeoisie” and the empoverished nobility. Cf. Jakπa RavliÊ, ≈Odraz domaÊe stvarnosti u
dubrovaËkoj knjiæevnosti. Ivan GunduliÊ i njegova Dubravka«. Anali Historijskog instituta JAZU
u Dubrovniku 4-5 (1956): pp. 323-353. According to his interpretation, GunduliÊ speaks from the
conservative, aristocratic position, criticizing the citizens who buy they way up the Republic’s
political hierarchy. In view of the historical facts and the nature of the Ragusan class society,
RavliÊ’s thesis is perfectly groundless. Within the Ragusan concept of aristocratic government
and class order, the citizenry, however wealthy it may have been, was never a political subject.
Namely, the ultimate and unattainable goal the wealthy citizens pursued until the last day of the
Republic was to join the patriciate and not fight against them and the specific aristocratic repub-
licanism. Zdenko Zlatar, The Slavic Epic: GunduliÊ’s Osman. New York: Peter Lang etc.,1993:
pp. 112-113; Zdenko Zlatar, ≈Boæanstvena komedija Ivana GunduliÊa: Nova interpretacija pjes-
nikove razvojne linije«. Dubrovnik N.S. 2/1 (1991): pp. 124-162.
Dubrovnik Annals 7 (2003)26
Within the poetic reflection of the contemporary ferment, GunduliÊ forewarns:
once the aristocratic harmony disappears, the much-celebrated Ragusan
freedom will follow too. 
The ideological dimension of the conflict, i.e., the “pro-” and “counter-
Ottoman” paradigm, should be correlated with an insight into the position of
GunduliÊ himself and his family against the conspirators’ faction. Remarkably
enough, Zdenko Zlatar is among those who failed to interpret the poet’s ex-
plicit condemnation of those responsible for the crisis: those who bribe and
are bribed, money-grubbers who “present Dubrava with gifts” and to whom
gold is a substitute for virtue. The drama is swarming with GunduliÊ’s allu-
sions and contempt towards all those capable of corrupting Dubravka, i.e.,
the Ragusan government, and who even bribe the judges with gold so that
“all the laws are annihilated and the freedom destroyed”. The abstract
essence of the divisive powers is personified by Grdan, a monster who wins
Dubrava through corruption and bribe, but to whom the poet assigns a back-
stage role, leaving him unseen and speechless.
Needless to say, from his poetical perspective, GunduliÊ in Dubravka was
not in the position to offer a political solution to the problem, i.e., the advanc-
ing Machiavellianism within the class which proved merciless in destroying
the medieval homogeneity. A happy and unexpected ending of this theological
and political allegory—Dubravka is being rescued from Grdan’s hands and
is united with Miljenko—was but a gift from Heaven. God Himself, Deus ex
machina, saves Dubravka, the freedom, patriciate’s power, the virtue of the
aristocracy—the Republic itself. 
With its voluminosity and narrative fabric, Osman exceeds Dubravka in
complexity. Despite a somewhat dispersed historical theme involving a
broad range of international events, this epic is even more significant for the
highlighting of the rift problem. The story of a Turkish sultan and a Polish
prince, interwoven with a myriad of historical, romantic, and eschatological
digressions, is, in fact, an epic of Dubrovnik. In order to interpret the appar-
ent contradiction between the seemingly counter-Ottoman character of
GunduliÊ’s Osman, and the fact that the author belonged to the adverse,
“pragmatic” faction, we should once again put aside the strict “pro-” and
“counter-Ottoman” key. Judging by the poet’s agnatic identity, his fierce
argumentation against the Ottoman institutional system may strike as illogical.
It seems, however, that GunduliÊ’s main focus was on the criticism of the
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governmental model, here being monarchical autocracy, because in Osman,
as more recent study of his epic has shown, the poet developed the main
theme much deeper than the apparent criticism of Islam and the Ottoman
Empire.30 Regardless of the critical appraisal, GunduliÊ’s orientalism in
Osman is merely a setting in which the poet presents over and again the
Ragusan position. Thus the assertion of Slobodan P. Novak, according to
which “Osman displays an abundance of the political and philosophical
digressions related to the fate of the poet’s Republic”31 provides an excellent
starting-point for the historian researching the rift among the Ragusan patri-
ciate. In Osman GunduliÊ renders himself as a genuine Ragusan, nobleman,
and a member of the political faction which balances between the Lion and
the Draco, and which in the policy of noninterference sees the warrant of the
Ragusan freedom. By stating that “GunduliÊ’s lines mirror the coldness of
the Ragusan pragmatism, the very coldness that helped the Republic
manoeuvre successfully between the East and the West”,32 Novak has rightly
anticipated GunduliÊ’s agnatically-based political orientation. Viewed in the
light of the nature of the conflict, the poet’s seemingly counter-Ottoman
position proves in fact as an excellent poetic and ideological argumentation
of the pragmatic faction in the rift. 
In the absence of more reliable historical sources, it is the allegorical layers
of GunduliÊ’s epic, indirect and manneristic in their appeal for the revival of
aristocratic harmony, that testify to the initial phase of the patrician division.
Though in this early stage divisive criteria were not clearly established, yet
the disastrous impact upon the very foundations of the Ragusan state was
anticipated. Observer and poet, Ivan GunduliÊ interwove into his poetic fabric
the ideological premise for the survival of the Republic of Dubrovnik.
6. The analysis of agnatic participation in the Great Conspiracy
In order to establish a link between the political conflict at the time of the
Great Conspiracy and the racial rift that followed, we have compared agnat-
ic participation in different factions during the Conspiracy with the casata-
based groups of the Salamancanists and the Sorbonnists which consolidated
30 Zoran Kravar, ≈Svjetovi “Osmana”«. Dubrovnik N.S. 2/1 (1991): pp. 106-108; S. P. Novak,
Povijest hrvatske knjiæevnosti III: pp. 256-275.
31 S. P. Novak, Povijest hrvatske knjiæevnosti III: p. 265.
32 S. P. Novak, Povijest hrvatske knjiæevnosti III: p. 269.
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in the post-earthquake period, that is, 60 years after the Great Conspiracy. At
the time, we have established 38 Salamancanist and 18 Sorbonnist branches
of the patrician families (ratio 2.1 : 1), considering that some families partic-
ipated in both factions (Table 1). In the absence of genealogical analysis of
the patrician circle of the period, we have not been able to establish with
exactitude which of the branches in the 1670s descend from the participants
in the events 60 years earlier. Thus by means of coefficients we tried to cal-
culate and determine the probable participation of the descendants of each
senator holding office during the Great Conspiracy in the factions which
were later formed. For the senators from the families whose branches
belonged to one faction only, we used the coefficient 1, while for the senators
whose families subsequently participated in both rival factions, the coef-
ficients have been established in proportion to the number of branches within
each group. Thus, for example, the Bona family with 3 Salamancanist and 3
Sorbonnist branches has the coefficient 0.5 (for the Salamancanists) and 0.5
(for the Sorbonnists), the Gozze (8 Salamancanist and 1 Sorbonnist branch)
has the coefficient 0.89 (for the Salamancanists) and 0.11 (for the Sorbonnists),
whereas the Sorgo (5 Salamancanist and 2 Sorbonnist branches) has the coef-
ficient 0.71 (for the Salamancanists) and 0.29 (for the Sorbonnists), etc.
Despite the possible risks this analysis may run, primarily because of the
inability to establish the political shifts of certain casate which most evi-
dently took place over the sixty-year period, the results still prove indicative.
The widest ratio gap between the Salamancanists- and the Sorbonnists-to-be
in favour of the former may be observed among the senators who supported
the conspirators (ratio 3.21 : 1, i.e., a deviation from the average ratio by
+1.19 towards the Salamancanist faction). A most advantageous ratio to the
Sorbonnists may be detected in the opposing faction, conditionally referred
to as the “Republican loyalists” (1.45 : 1, a deviation from the average ratio
by -0.57 towards the Sorbonnist faction), while the mean value rests in the
so-called “grey area”, a term coined by Zdenko Zlatar,33 denoting non-parti-
san senators (1.93 : 1, a deviation from the average ratio by -0.09) (Tables 1
and 2, Graph 1). Having in mind that the leading conspirators belong to the
families which subsequently grouped exclusively around the Salamancanist
core (Resti, Giorgi), there is every ground to believe that the Salamancanist-
Sorbonnist class-division draws its roots from the eventful period of the
33 Z. Zlatar, Our Kingdom Come: pp. 299-358.
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Table 2. Faction participation of senators in the Great Conspiracy of
1610/12 by  group their offspring belonged to after the 1667 earthquake
Graph 1. Faction participation of senators in the Great Conspiracy of
1610/12 by group their offspring belonged to after the 1667 earthquake
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Great Conspiracy. 
The “counter-Ottoman” oriented conspirators who were sentenced to
death won a political victory over the pragmatic faction of the “Republican
loyalists”. Not only was their sentence mitigated, but also the conspirators
were encouraged to escape. This incident further polarized the nobility, de-
veloping a rift between the conspirators’ kin and the prosecutors. In the
course of the investigation a remarkable exchange of social roles took place,
so that the traitors were eventually acclaimed heroes and the prosecutors
labeled as hangmen. The majority of the politically neutral patricians sided
with the party which booked a social victory. A strong agnatically based faction
formed around the core of the conspiracy leaders, and became fully articu-
lated after the aggregation of the new nobility in the 17th century; in the 18th
century they were commonly called Salamankezi (the Salmancanists). For a
century-and-a-half this faction played a dominant role in the Ragusan political
life, while an inferior position was reserved for the so-called Sorbonezi (the
Sorbonnists), who eventually coalesced with the new nobility.
7. The crisis of the patriciate in mid-seventeenth century and the aggre-
gation of the new nobility 
A substantial decline in the number of patrician families, the great earth-
quake of 1667, and the Republic’s struggle for the political survival largely
intensified the political conflicts, giving way to a yet deeper rift. The change
of the broader geopolitical setting after the Vienna war provided new con-
troversial issues on which the patricians polarized, their agnatic homogeneity
being put to the greatest test since the Great Conspiracy. An unfinished
“blood” grouping was a perfect base to an even deeper rift within the patri-
ciate after the aggregation of the new nobility.
In the previous period, the last family was admitted among the nobles in
1336. That was the Bucchia family, whose members played a significant
diplomatic role in the acquisition of the Peljeπac peninsula, which was of
great strategic interest.34 Over the next 300 years, the Major Council, the
body of all the adult male patricians, remained closed for new members.
Although the participation of the nobility in the overall city population dis-
played a negative tendency, it was not until the 17th century that a serious
34 I. Mahnken, DubrovaËki patricijat u XIV veku: p. 163.
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biological crisis of the patriciate took place.35 It is certain that the main reasons
for the phenomenon of the thinning of the patrician ranks were other than
economic.36 Namely, the strict endogamous model proved fatal to the demo-
graphic processes, leading the rank to most certain extinction. Intuitive meas-
ures as part of individual family strategies (early marriage of a noblewoman
in order to make the most of her fertile period, very close birth-spacing, con-
sanguineous marriage, etc.) did prove reproductive in stable social condi-
tions,37 but were not effective enough in the crisis such as that after the earth-
quake in 1667, when the patrician rank was practically brought to the verge
of existence. 
The fact that the crisis of the elite was often on the agenda of the council
meetings confirms that the patriciate identified the problem of its class repro-
duction long before the 1667 earthquake. The chances of stopping the nega-
tive trend were little because the traditional institutional model was very
resistant to substantial changes. Subject to strong disapproval on behalf of
certain noble circles, patrician consolidation by means of introducing new
families into the rank proved a difficult and time-consuming process. Despite
the aspiration to strengthen the aristocratic rank by admitting new families,
these efforts led towards an even deeper rift within the patriciate. 
By the mid-17th century the patriciate’s deep-seated attitude towards the
strict class endogamy became more liberal. The Senate’s first proposition to
35 Writing on the early days of the Ragusan history, an anonymous annalist and Nikola Ragni-
na mention more than 150 patrician families, Diversis lists only 33 in 1440, and Serafin Razzi
makes a reference to 29 living families in 1588. Milan Reπetar, ≈Popis dubrovaËkijeh vlasteoski-
jeh porodica«. Glasnik dubrovaËkog uËenog druπtva ‘Sveti Vlaho’ 1 (1929): pp. 1-11.
36 Dragoljub PavloviÊ was the first to come forward with a detailed analysis of the crisis of
the Ragusan patriciate, which started with the seventeenth century. Dragoljub PavloviÊ, ≈O krizi
vlasteoskog staleæa u Dubrovniku XVII veka«. Zbornik radova SANU 17 (1952): pp. 27-38. On
the basis of the research on the patricians’ credit investments and the political context of their af-
fairs, PavloviÊ’s drastic assessment was rejected by Zdenko Zlatar. The latter concludes that in
early seventeenth century the Ragusan patriciate still maintained the leading financial role in the
import-export business market between Italy and the Balkans, and its substantial decline in num-
ber was a result of the long-standing demographic trends drawn out in the fourteenth century. Ac-
cording to Zlatar, the crisis developed from the patrician political conflict concerning the count-
er-Ottoman plans of the Western rulers. Zdenko Zlatar, ≈The ‘Crisis’ of the Patriciate in Early
Seventeenth-Century Dubrovnik: A Reappraisal« Balcanica 6 (1975): pp. 111-131.
37 For more details see: Nenad VekariÊ et al., Vrijeme æenidbe i ritam poroda: Dubrovnik i
njegova okolica od 17. do 19. stoljeÊa. Zagreb-Dubrovnik: Zavod za povijesne znanosti HAZU u
Dubrovniku, 2000: pp. 108-109.
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allow 5 citizen families to purchase their noble status for the amount of
10,000 ducats was denied on the Major Council session of November 15,
1646, with 82 votes against and 37 votes for.38 It took the Senate 12 years to
put the aggregation issue back on the agenda, and on November 19, 1658, the
former assigned the proveditori to work out a regulation on the “preservation
and reproduction” of the patriciate. Three years later, the law finally saw the
light after the Senate’s repeated demand of March 24, 1661.39 The regulation
was acclaimed on the Major Council on March 26, 1662, with a close vote
of 52 to 51 in favour.40 The decision was entirely of principal nature and
regulated the admission of new noble candidates from distinguished Ragusan
merchant families or foreign nobility only when an old casata or famiglia
died out, and by a majority of votes on all the three councils. This regulation
produced little effect, and on January 18, 1664, the Senate passed yet another,
more detailed rule pertaining to the aggregation procedure. It was decided
that 10 new families would be admitted, together or respectively. The choice
of each new family would have to be acclaimed by the majority of votes on
all the three councils, the candidate being obliged to benefit the Republic
with a contribution of 10,000 Spanish pesos. The decision further defined the
family members who could acquire the noble prerogatives. They included
husband and wife and their legitimate children, along with the husband’s single
sisters and single brothers. It should be pointed out that neither this decision
nor the preceding ones made any attempt to prejudice an inferior status of the
new nobility in view of the old one. Conversely, it had been stated on several
occasions that the newly admitted families would enjoy all the privileges and
prerogatives of the patrician status. The decision was voted out on April 19,
1666 with a majority of 64 in favour to 33 against.41
Two years after this decision had been passed, in 1666, the last descendant
of the Luccari noble family died, spurring the Senate to make a choice among
38 Acta Maioris Consilii, vol. 39, ff. 31-32 (SAD). D. PavloviÊ, ≈O krizi vlasteoskog staleæa«:
p. 30.
39 Acta Consilii Rogatorum, vol. 108, f. 283; vol. 110 (March 24); D. PavloviÊ, ≈O krizi vlas-
teoskog staleæa«: p. 33.
40 Acta Maioris Consilii, vol. 43, f. 63; D. PavloviÊ, ≈O krizi vlasteoskog staleæa«: pp. 33-34.
41 Acta Maioris Consilii, vol. 44, f. 90. The provision of 1664 did not explicitely repeat the
clause of the law of 1662 that the new family would be aggregated only unless an old died out,
but the course of the events which followed prove that it was so.
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the proposed candidates for the nobility.42 With the dying out of the Benessa
family, the Senate announced another vacancy in the rank on July 27, 1666.43
The first family was admitted on November 5, 1666, when the Major Council
opened the patrician doors to one of the wealthiest citizens, Vlaho Bosdari,
who contributed with 5,000 ducats to the Republic treasury.44 During this session,
the petition of another candidate, Miho Sorgo Bobali, was voted down with
48 to 47 votes. This well-to-do merchant and the Republic’s diplomatic con-
fidant in Venice was admitted during the next session, held on November 10,
1666, with 56 to 38 votes in favour.45 At the same time the petitions of Petar
Radagli, Marin and Ivan Dimitri, Miho ZlatariÊ, and Benedikt Marinetti
Primi were denied at first, but after some reconsideration, admitted.46
In the meantime, on November 5, 1666, the Major Council decided on yet
another weighty matter. The three regulations concerning the liberalization
of marriage represented a small step towards permeability.47 The first regula-
tion annulled the formerly effective ban of patrician marriages in the third
degree of consanguinity. The restrictive practice of marrying noblewomen
from the Dalmatian cities was replaced by a regulation according to which
any noble outsider was considered a suitable match, regardless of her local
origin. The third and by far the most important regulation allowed the Ragu-
san patricians to choose their brides from the prominent citizen families, until
decreed otherwise.48
42 Acta Maioris Consilii, vol. 44, f. 90.
43 Acta Consilii Rogatorum, vol. 113, f. 184.
44 Acta Maioris Consilii, sv. 44, ff. 117v, 118. Bosdari was admitted with 51 vote in favour
and 44 against, and his petition was on the Senate’s agenda as early as October 30 (Acta Consilii
Rogatorum, sv. 113, f. 214.).
45 Acta Maioris Consilii, vol. 44, ff. 119v-120v. On the merits of Sorgo-Bobali in the Repub-
lic’s service during the Candian War, see V. ForetiÊ, Povijest Dubrovnika II: pp. 104-114. 
46 Acta Consilii Rogatorum, vol. 113, f. 215v.
47 Acta Maioris Consilii, vol. 44, f. 115; D. PavloviÊ, ≈O krizi vlasteoskog staleæa«: pp. 36-37.
48 The first decision (54:36) apparently narrowed the marriage pool as it allowed marriage be-
tween close blood relations, but actually it was aimed at stimulating the patricians to marry, as,
for example, great many noblewomen remained single because of the considerable dowries their
fathers were to give the prospective son-in-laws from other patrician families. By marrying a
closer relative, the dowry was smaller or was given to a member of the same family. The second
decision (60:30) allowed marriage with foreign noblewomen. The third decision with the narrow-
est vote of 48 to 41 was aimed at stimulating the patricians to marry spouses from the well-off
nonnoble families who would contribute with a substantial dowry. 
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Mass losses of patricians killed in the great earthquake of April 6, 1667,
as well as the economic, financial, and political crisis which befell the Repub-
lic, speeded the process of aggregation of new families and worked to its
advantage.49 Thus on June 10, 1667, the Major Council instructed the proved-
itori to modify the regulation on the aggregation of 10 families with an intent
to shorten the admission procedure, regardless of the vacancies available.50
The status still had a price, 10,000 thaler, conditioned by a majority vote on
all the three councils.51
On July 30, 1667, as a token of gratitude for community service in the
post-earthquake period, another member of the Bosdari family, Diodat, was
admitted into the patrician rank with a narrow vote. The same session wit-
nessed the aggregation of three wealthier citizen families of Dubrovnik.
Jakov Natali purchased his admission for 1,000 and Ivan Clasci (KlaπiÊ) for
600 Hungarian gold coins. Miho ZlatariÊ agreed to pay 3,000 daily wages,
amounting to 1,300 hyperperi for the clearing away of the destroyed build-
ings.52 On August 19, 1667, guided by the Republic’s common welfare, the
Major Council decided to add two more families to the list, not failing to
stress that the newly admitted nobles would enjoy equal prerogatives as their
old counterparts. On this session the Ragusan patriciate welcomed Cardinal
Barberini to the council, a passionate advocate of Ragusan interests in Vati-
can, with his brothers and nephews.53
49 According to Zlatar’s research, 376 patricians were sitting on the Major Council in 1600.
Their number constantly declined, and in 1650 it came down to only 177 men (Z. Zlatar, Our
Kingdom Come: p. 47). In the first two years after the 1667 earthquake, the sessions of the Major
Council were attended by 60 members on average.
50 This decision was voted on unanimously (10:0) during the Senate session held on June 3,
1667. Acta Consilii Rogatorum, vol. 114, f. 55. The Major Council confirmed the decision with a
narrow majority of 20 to 18. Acta Maioris Consilii, vol. 44, ff. 200-201.
51 Particular cases of the aggregation of new nobles were on the voting agenda of the Major
Council and the Senate only. As the Minor Council at the time consisted of senators, there was no
need for the voting to be repeated. The amount contributed by the petitioner varied in practice, as
each of them paid according to his financial ability.
52 Acta Maioris Consilii, vol. 44, ff. 208-211. Bosdari was admitted with 24 votes in favour
and 22 opposed, Natali 26:20, ZlatariÊ 36:9, and KlaπiÊ 25:21. Two more distinguished citizens,
Miho Marini and Antun Trifoni, members of the St. Anthony fraternity, also petitioned, but were
rejected (23:23 and 28:18).
53 Acta Maioris Consilii, vol. 44, ff. 211-212. The decison received the majority vote of 48 to 2.
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The admission of new members seemed to have lost in rhythm in the
years which followed, and the already voted out decision on the aggregation
of two extra families, plus the original ten, never came into effect. In 1668
two foreign families were admitted. On June 27, 1668, Marquis Anibale
Poroni was accorded patrician status, and on November 26, Paolo, Frances-
co, Gian Carlo, and Ottavio Pierizzi, brothers and sons of the late Pietro Pie-
rizzi of Bologna soon followed, agreeing to buy real estate in Dubrovnik.54
After a gap of two years, three new domestic families were ennobled. With
a vote 28 for to 24 against on the Major Council, on June 6, 1670, the noble
title was conferred upon Benedikt Marinetti Primi, who gave his assurance
to pay 1,000 ducats. Under the same conditions, with a minimum overvote of
21 to 20, Bernard Giorgi, member of a citizen branch of the Giorgi patrician
family was also admitted. There is no evidence of the fund paid or the even-
tual merits of Mitar Seratura, who was admitted during the same session with
a vote of 27 for to 25 against.55 Andrija Paoli was introduced into the patri-
cian circle on the Major Council session held on August 28, 1670, the vote
being 27 to 21. He promised to contribute a sum of 1,500 ducats, drawn from
his wife’s dowry and deposited at a bank in Naples.56 Eight years passed
before the admission of the last candidate took place. On June 25, 1678, with
a close vote of 33 to 32, Petar VodopiÊ, was accorded patrician status.57
The controversies over the admission of the new nobles did not disappear
from the political agenda. Although no specific entries on the subject can be
traced in the council’s records before 1696, the decisions of the Major
Council dated February 13 of the same year confirm that the aggregation
issue had remained open until the date. These decisions put a final stop to
permeability. Namely, all the former decisions concerning the admission of
the new nobles had been annulled, and the issue could be brought back on
the agenda only by the positive vote of two thirds of the members on all the
three councils. Since then, the same majority of two thirds was required for
every decision concerning the aggregation of the nobility.58 The provisions of
54 Acta Maioris Consilii, vol. 44, ff. 256rv (28:19); vol. 45, f. 7rv (30:22).
55 Acta Maioris Consilii, vol. 45, ff. 58v-61.
56 Acta Maioris Consilii, vol. 45, f. 77rv.
57 Acta Maioris Consilii, vol. 47, ff. 129v-130.
58 Acta Maioris Consilii, vol. 50, ff. 260v-261v. 
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1696 prove that a strong anti-aggregation faction took the lead among the
patricians. 
8. The Salamancanists and the Sorbonnists: endogamy within endogamy
The number of decisions and votings most directly shows that the admis-
sion of the new nobility had always been a thorny issue. Although patriciate’s
political will in favour of the aggregation was not as sincere, the results of
the voting demonstrate that the majority believed that the solutions offered
were the only way out of biological extinction. However, the consolidation
of the class, as a declared goal of the aggregation, was not attained. None of
the members of the Barberini, Poroni and Pierizzi families ever moved to
Dubrovnik nor did they participate in the government. Moreover, most of the
newly ennobled families soon died off: Sorgo-Bobali in 1736, Giorgi-
Bernardo in 1737 with the death of the poet Nikola (Ignjat), Clasci in 1791,
and Paoli in 1800. Only three of the new noble families lived to see the fall
of the Republic: the Bosdari, Natali, and ZlatariÊ.
Not only did the action for the revitalization of the patrician class fail but
it gave way to an unbridgeable rift within the rank. Although the old and the
new nobles were officially equal before the law,59 everyday political practice
diverged greatly from the declared principle.60 Since the 1690s, actually three
59 According to all the cited decisions concerning aggregation, the new nobility was to enjoy
each and every privilege of the Ragusan patriciate. In 1671 the Senate rejected the proposal for
the noblewomen of older families to be given the right to have better seats (probably in church or
theatre). In 1675 Frano Gozze stated clearly in his will that in case his daughter married a “new”
or aggregato, as he put it, she would be disinherited. This pejorative term spurred the Senate to
have Gozze’s sentence reworded by replacing agreggato with a syntagm “not of the old houses”.
Milan Reπetar, ≈Salamankezi i Sorbonezi«. DubrovaËki list 2/19 (1925): p. 1. In the official de-
scription of the patrician prerogatives, drafted by the Republic’s secretary on June 25, 1795, the
class equality is explicitely stated. Fedi ed Attestati, vol. 8, f. 96. (“Che nella Nobiltà della Nos-
tra Repubblica di Ragusa non vi sono classi.”)
60 Æarko MuljaËiÊ has come forward with a hypothesis on the considerable formalization of
the differences between the patricians. In favour of his argument, MuljaËiÊ refers to a Salaman-
canist Tomo Bassegli and his certificate of citizenship from 1783. The document reads that
Bassegli is “Senatorii ordinis vir”, implying the existence of nobles unworthy of senatorial position
(Æ. MuljaËiÊ, ≈O strankama u starom Dubrovniku«: p. 25). Such a formulation, however, has no
legal ground in any of the councils’ decisions, and the fact that the members of the newly admitted
families were not elected in the Senate before the 1780s is merely the result of oligarchic rela-
tions and outvote, since the electoral system suited the coterie which held majority in the Senate.
Furthermore, certificates such as Bassegli’s were issued for use outside the Republic and were of-
ten “embellished” with an affirmative detail or two.
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patrician groups were on the scene. The newly ennobled men were restricted
access to all the high offices of the state, and in the political sense they de
facto represented the second-class aristocracy. Some of the old patricians
(the Sorbonnists), who sided with the new through marriage ties, represented a
genuine political subject and as such could not have been excluded from the
holding of government office. The remaining majority of the old patriciate
(the Salamancanists) remained loyal to endogamy from the time before the
aggregation, deciding to further restrict its mating practice by excluding the
old nobles who had accepted the new ones by their marriage arrangements
(Table 3).61
61 The French consul Le Maire reports in 1776 on the aggregation and genesis of the patrician
rift after the earthquake. Devoid of details on the social and political background of the events,
Le Maire’s report tends to present the whole process in a somewhat shambolic light: “When the
patricians realized how few they were, they considered it prudent to allow several nonnoble fam-
ilies into their rank. They chose the wealthiest and the most distinguished among those spared by
the earthquake. Additionally, they allowed marriages between noble and nonnoble families. Such
an inovation, proven necessary in the given circumstances, had become the source of consider-
able abuse and feud in earnest. When some of the noblemen acting in conformity with the new
regulation married down by taking women from the new nobility or the citizen class, those who
had not yet married accordingly changed their mind. The patricians were no longer allowed to
marry the lower ranks. They looked down on the new nobility and their affines. Then a tripartite
differentiation was introduced among the nobility: the old, the new, and the middle.” Le Maire also
wrote that “the old” were meticulously observant in how “pure blooded” the members of “the
new” were. Thus according to the degree and the number of affinal relations with the aggregates and
their offspring, there existed numerous subgroups of “the new”, which further encouraged the




Table 3. Division among the patriciate
A modest number of the aggregated families demonstrate that they them-
selves could not have been in the position to cause an unbridgeable inner-
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class rift within the aristocracy at the close of the 17th century.62 No doubt
the reasons behind the breakup should be sought in different political positions
and attitudes within the old patriciate itself in the period before the process
of aggregation, as mentioned earlier in the article. It may also be assumed
that the conflict had its roots back in the Great Conspiracy days. Future
genealogical analysis would most certainly confirm that the number of marriages
between the members of the rival groups soon started to decrease, while the
patricians from the “grey area” through marriage policy opted for either of
the factions. For after the earthquake (and probably already before it), the
“grey area” no more existed, as each patrician had definitely taken sides.
Although the aggregation as a measure of class consolidation was the first
issue which aroused bitter tensions between the conservative and a more lib-
eral faction and among each of them, the discussion eventually concentrated
on a somewhat higher level around a dilemma of whether or not the aggre-
gation will help save the Ragusan patrician rank from extinction. If a min-
imum consensus had not been reached, the decision in favour of aggregation
and other subsequent decisions pertaining to the admission of new nobles
would never have been brought, because the group which later advocated for
the “pure blood” criterion dominated by the majority of two-thirds. Thus
their consent was essential for the passing of the decisions.
It was after the aggregation of the new nobility that the events took an
unexpected turn. The numerically superior group, thanks to which the deci-
sions on aggregation were passed, shifts the position and decides to ignore its
own decisions in practice. Unable to change them, they could still distance
from them. But, to keep distance from the new nobility was only a second-
ary motive. The main aim, which proved essential and key to the whole story,
was to distinguish clearly from the old nobility which accepted the new
nobles. As the minority noble group saw in the new nobility a chance of its
own promotion and strengthening in terms of numerical growth, it uncondi-
tionally accepted the new patricians. The dominant group, however, having
62 The authors who have examined this problem observed that the “new” faction increased
through marriages with the “old” families, because the latter, according to the “blood” criterion,
automatically acquired the status of “the new”. See: Æ. MuljaËiÊ, ≈O strankama u starom Dubrovni-
ku«: pp. 25-40; Æ. MuljaËiÊ, ≈Salamankezi i sorbonezi u Dubrovniku«: pp. 161-173; Æ. MuljaËiÊ,
≈Istraga protiv jakobinaca 1797. god. u Dubrovniku«: pp. 235-252.
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realized that by voting in favour of aggregation it voted against itself, came
forward with a “pure blood” theory, which introduced the criteria for estab-
lishing aristocratic pedigree. The “pure blood” thesis has no genuine ideo-
logical background, being merely a pragmatic attempt to correct one’s own
mistake, a last-ditch effort of the Salamancanists to secure their dominant
position. Such a course of events casts a new light on the first post-earth-
quake period as well. In the general atmosphere of hopelessness, a murderer
and a problematic character such as Marojica Caboga, a Sorbonnist partisan,
proved himself a praiseworthy Ragusan hero, with the result that his stature
as well as his influence on the new nobility irritated the adherents of the dom-
inant faction. 
Thus it was the admission of the new that marked a definite class division.
On the one hand, the split manifested as an acceptance of the new members
as equals, inter-marriage with them, and on the other, as their rejection, isol-
ation and “pure blood” ideology. The initial phase of the rift took a rapid
course, mainly during the first generation after the aggregation. The rigid and
merciless “blood” division pushed the original ideological disagreements out
of the limelight, while the members of both groups showed differences in
opinion generated by the change on the political scene. The “blood” division
encapsulated the outcome of the earlier family feuds caused by personal and
political differences among the patriciate. From then until the fall of the
Republic, the Salamancanist-Sorbonnist division functioned as a pattern in
all the inner-class relations and conflicts.
The key to understanding of the rift may be established genealogically by
analyzing the marriage ties between the members of the Ragusan patrician
families. On the basis of genealogical analysis of 232 patrician marriages in
the period between the earthquake of 1667 and the fall of the Republic in
1808,63 and the only complete list of the Salamancanists and the Sorbonnists
compiled by Inocent »uliÊ in 1817,64 we have been able to establish with
63 The analysis is based on the genealogies reconstructed from the registers of the baptized
(K) and married (V) of the City parish (Dubrovnik): G5K (1671-1687); G6K (1688-1705); G7K
(1706-1711); G8K (1711-1728); G9K (1729-1758); G10K (1758-1798); G11K (1799-1812); G3V
(1706-1722); G4V (1722-1728); G5V (1729-1778); G6V (1778-1821) (SAD).
64 The list is taken from the report on the Ragusan patriciate, the author of which was a notorious
Austrian confidant, fra Inocent »uliÊ (1782-1852)., Miscellanea, vol. 23, position 16.l.46 (State
Archives of Zadar).
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exactitude the existence of two distinct groups. Although recent research has
not yet dated the origin of the terms Salamancanist and Sorbonnist (the first
record of the names dates from the second half of the 18th century), we shall
employ these group references for the entire period from the aggregation
until the fall of the Republic. While the Salamancanists were composed of
the members of the old patriciate only, the Sorbonnists may be divided into
two subgroups: the old and the new nobility (see Table 3). 
Legend:
Table 4. Patrician families and their branches by participation in the Salaman-
canist or Sorbonnist faction (1667-1808).
Source: Patrician genealogical tables reconstructed on the basis of Dubrovnik
parish registers.
Sorbonnists - new nobility
Sorbonnists - old nobility
Salamancanists
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Although the division bears an accentuated agnatic distinction, the sur-
name, however, does not feature as a distinctive element. One should have in
mind that in the period investigated Ragusan patrician families had centuries-
old histories behind them. Numerous cross-marriages contributed to the clos-
er knitting of the patrician network and the same surname no longer stood in
relevant correlation with the degree of kinship. That is why we find patri-
cians who share the same surname, but are distributed in both groups. As a
rule, smaller families belong to only one group, that of the Salamancanists —
Bassegli (1 family), Benessa (1), Bonda (1), BuÊa (2), Giorgi-Bona (1),
Gradi (2), Ragnina (1), Resti (1), and Tudisi (2), while Gondola (1), Palmotta
(1), Proculo (1), and Saraca (1) belonged to the rival Sorbonnist group. The
rest, larger patrician families, have branches in both groupings: Gozze (8
branches belonged to the Salamancanist group and one to that of the
Sorbonnists), Sorgo (5:2), Bona (3:3), Pozza (2:1), Zamagna (2:1), Ghetaldi
(2:1), Menze (1:2), Bobali (1:1), Caboga (1:1), and Cerva (1:1). All the mem-
bers of the new nobility, naturally, supported the Sorbonnist group (Bosdari,
Clasci, Giorgi, Natali, Paoli, Sorgo-Bobali, and ZlatariÊ). 
The marriage analysis undoubtedly confirms the existence of two separate
endogamous systems. Out of 232 marriages between 1667 and 1808, as
many as 217 (93.53%) were within the same group (Table 5; the blue rect-
angle stands for marriages among the Salamancanists, while the pink-yellow
rectangle stands for those among the Sorbonnists). The Salamancanist group
had 126 in-marriages (54.31%), and the Sorbonnists 91 (39.22%). There
were only 15 cross-marriages (6.47%): 8 marriages have been recorded
between a male Salamancanist and a female Sorbonnist (3.45%), while a
male Sorbonnist married a Salamancanist bride 7 times (2.16%) (Table 6,
Graph 2).
Table 5. Marriages between patrician families (1667-1808)
Source: Patrician genealogical tables reconstructed on the basis of Dubrovnik
parish registers
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Table 6. Marriages by the patrician groupings







Salamancanist (m) - Salamancanist (f)
Sorbonnist (m) - Sorbonnist (f)
Salamancanist (m) - Sorbonnist (f)
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Not a single exception has been recorded with marriages of the new no-
bility: bride or bridegroom stemmed from the Sorbonnist circle. Twenty-
eight (87.5%) out of 32 marriages involved a member of the new nobility and
a Sorbonnist. In the remaining 4 marriages both spouses belonged to the new
nobility (Table 7). This data is an excellent proof of the “pure blood” principle
operating as a precondition of the participation in the Salamancanist circle.











Salamancanist (m) - Sorbonnist 
(f, new nobility)
Sorbonnist (m, new nobility) - 
Salamancanist (f)
Sorbonnist (m, old nobility) - 
Sorbonnist (f, new nobility)
Sorbonnist (m, new nobility) - 
Sorbonnist (f, old nobility)
Sorbonnist (m, new nobility) - 
Sorbonnist (f, new nobility)
According to MuljaËiÊ, a Salamancanist groom who married a Sorbonnist
bride “did not ipso facto become a Sorbonnist by blood, as would his chil-
dren...”.65 The idea underlying this interpretation clearly rests upon the prin-
ciple of “pure bloodline”: the bridegroom is of pure descent because both his
parents are pure-blooded, but his children are not since their mother is a Sor-
bonnist. The Salamancanist-Sorbonnist division, however, rests upon pol-
itical differences as well. A Salamancanist groom who married a Sorbonnist
bride accepted the “Sorbonnist principle” and the fact that his children would
draw on the Sorbonnist lineage. Viewed politically, he is a Sorbonnist and
65 “According to the Ragusan understanding” are MuljaËiÊ’s exact words, for which he fails
to provide a source (Æ. MuljaËiÊ, ≈O strankama u starom Dubrovniku«: p. 26).
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not a Salamancanist.66
By marrying a Sorbonnist bride, a Salamancanist groom is subject to con-
version from a Salamancanist to a Sorbonnist. In 7 out of 8 marriages of the kind
conversion took place, and only once, despite his marriage with a Sorbonnist
bride, was (most likely) a Salamancanist bridegroom to retain his original group
identity.67 Vice-versa, a Sorbonnist was never to become a Salamancanist by
marrying a Salamancanist bride, which demonstrates the conservative attitude
of the group in that “impure blood” cannot be “purified”. Marriages between a
Sorbonnist bridegroom and a Salamancanist bride are probably due to a specif-
ic set of circumstances as the one we have been able to trace between a Sorgo
Sorbonnist bridegroom and a Gozze Salamancanist bride. Melhior Gozze
(1747-1787), a Salamancanist, committed suicide in Luka ©ipanska on October
14, 1787.68 In less than three months, on January 11, 1788, his widow remarried
a Sorbonnist, Mato Sorgo. Her minor daughter from the marriage with Melhior,
a Salamancanist, brought up in a Sorbonnist household of her step-father, mar-
ried the latter’s brother, Marin Sorgo, also a Sorbonnist, in 1802. Therefore,
according to her patrilineal origin, she was a Salamancanist, but being bred in a
Sorbonnist environment, she could not have but married a Sorbonnist. 
At the time of the aggregation of the new nobility in the post-earthquake
period, the Salamancanists considerably outnumbered their opponents. An
overall perspective of the period between 1667 and the fall of the Republic
in 1808 shows that they were a stronger group. Two-hundred and sixty-seven
(57.54%) young couples belong to the Salamancanist group, while 197 (42.46%)
to that of the Sorbonnists. Among the latter, however, 161 (34.70%) belonged
to the old nobility, and 36 (7.76%) to the new aristocracy. The ratio in favour
of the Salamancanists proved much higher in the beginning. The change in
66 MuljaËiÊ falsely asserts that by the end of the eighteenth century when the Sorbonnist fac-
tion acquired the majority, there were cases of newly recruited Sorbonnists “because his wife or
kin were of the kind”. MuljaËiÊ provides evidence on the brothers Boæo-Marija and Dæivo-Luigi
Ghetaldi who entered the Major Council in 1786-1787 (Æ. MuljaËiÊ, ≈O strankama u starom
Dubrovniku«: p. 27, note 9). The mentioned brothers, however, belong to the Ghetaldi branch
which had already grouped with the Sorbonnist in the seventeenth century (see Table 4).
67 Junije Ragnina (1723-1772), a Salamancanist, married on November 3, 1765 a Sorbonnist
Nika, daughter of Luko Bona (1747-1818). Although there is no reliable evidence to support his
Salamancanist identity in marriage, as they had no offspring, the fact that the wife remarried a
Salamancanist from the Sorgo family in 1773 may be indicative.
68 “...occisus ex se ipso in venatione, cuius corpus seguenti die inventum est in silva in loco
vulgo dicto visce Lucize...” (L©6M, Parish Archives of Luka ©ipanska).



























Table 8. Salamancanists and Sorbonnists in 1817
Sources: Report of fra Inocent »uliÊ, Miscellanea, vol. 23, pos. 16.1.46
(State Archives in Zadar); Census of the City of Dubrovnik, 1817, F. IV,
114 (State Archives in Dubrovnik).
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ratio took place later because the “pure blood” principle worked on behalf of
the Sorbonnists and increased their number, and reversely, reduced the num-
ber of their opponents. According to the census of 1817, the Sorbonnists out-
number the Salamancanists by 62.67% to 37.33% (Table 8). Although the
number of converted marriages was rather low, merely 7, out of which only
3 with off-spring, their influence on the power balance, if a modest size of
the group, was essential. In 1817, the participation of the spouses from the
“mixed” marriages in the overall number of marriages was 16%, implying
that the Salamancanist group may still overrate the Sorbonnists (53.33%) had
the marriage conversions taken place (Table 9, Graph 3).69 There were four
cases of conversion. The first, when two Ghetaldi brothers, Dominik (1677-
1746) and Frano (1682-1754), married in 1703/4 the two sisters of the short-
lived Sorbonnist branch of the Pozza, thus taking upon themselves the Sor-
bonnist identity.70 Mato Bucchia (1682-1760) became a Sorbonnist by mar-
rying a Sorbonnist noblewoman from the Sorgo family in 1725. On the same
day, August 31, 1760, Ivan Bona (1710-1795) and Nikola Sorgo (1717-1790)
married two sisters, daughters of a Sorbonnist Mato Zamagna. The last cases
took place on November 3, 1765, when Junije Ragnina (1723-1772) and
Nikola Gozze (1727-1799) married the daughters of a Sorbonnist, Luko Bona.
A slight fall in the number of the Salamancanists and a rise of the Sorbon-
nists can be traced from the membership of the Major Council. The participa-
tion of the Sorbonnists was below 40% in the 1760s, but it shows a continu-
ous increase by exceeding 50% in 1771, and reaching 56.82% at the turn of
the century (Table 10, Graph 4).71
69 Thus MuljaËiÊ erroneously concludes that the Sorbonnist families had a higher birth rate
and a greater number of male infants (Æ. MuljaËiÊ, ≈O strankama u starom Dubrovniku«: p. 29).
70 Misguided by Kata Bassegli’s letter from 1781, Æarko MuljaËiÊ concludes that it was then
that the Ghetaldi family joined the Sorbonnists: “... l’altra fazione si occupa a far reclute facendo
nuovi sposalizij: i Getaldi miei vicini tutti due si sono sposati...” (Æ. MuljaËiÊ, ≈O strankama u
starom Dubrovniku«: p. 34, note 29). But the words of Kata Bassegli should not be interpreted in
the sense that the Ghetaldi then joined the Sorbonnists, but as her own commentary on their re-
productive strategy in that marriage was the means of securing their lineage and increasing the
Sorbonnist circle.
71 A similar statistic has been provided by Æarko MuljaËiÊ, but his ratio of the Salamancanists
and the Sorbonnists differs markedly in favour of the former, probably because he failed to ident-
ify the Saraca and the Proculo as Sorbonnist families. He also failed to discern that the Ghetaldi
joined the Sorbonnists much earlier. Some families which had members in both factions MuljaËiÊ
decided to group as Salamancanists only. Thus, according to MuljaËiÊ, it was not until 1796 that
the Sorbonnists outnumbered the Salamancanists (Æ. MuljaËiÊ, ≈O strankama u starom Dubrov-
niku«: pp. 28-29).
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Table 9. The structure of the Salamancanists and Sorbonnists by the census of
1817
Graph 3. The structure of the Salamancanists and Sorbonnists by the census of
1817





















8855 2872 0321 2551 97.94 6082 1541 5531 12.05 205 89.8
1571 721 47 24 23 72.85 35 42 92 37.14 41 20.11
2571 921 67 24 43 19.85 35 42 92 90.14 41 58.01
3571 721 67 14 53 48.95 15 22 92 61.04 41 20.11
4571 521 57 63 93 00.06 05 32 72 00.04 41 02.11
5571 321 47 53 93 61.06 94 32 62 48.93 31 75.01
6571 021 27 53 73 00.06 84 22 62 00.04 31 38.01
7571 911 17 43 73 66.95 84 22 62 43.04 21 80.01
8571 711 76 43 33 72.75 05 32 72 47.24 21 62.01
9571 711 76 23 53 72.75 05 42 62 47.24 31 11.11
0671 711 46 13 33 07.45 35 62 72 03.54 31 11.11
1671 911 46 82 63 87.35 55 72 82 22.64 21 80.01
2671 911 46 62 83 87.35 55 42 13 22.64 21 80.01
3671 711 46 72 73 07.45 35 42 92 03.54 21 62.01
4671 911 56 82 73 26.45 45 62 82 83.54 21 80.01
5671 221 46 32 14 64.25 85 92 92 45.74 21 48.9
6671 911 26 22 04 01.25 75 03 72 09.74 11 42.9
7671 711 16 02 14 41.25 65 03 62 68.74 11 04.9
8671 511 95 81 14 03.15 65 92 72 07.84 11 75.9
9671 901 65 81 83 83.15 35 72 62 26.84 9 62.8
0771 901 55 71 83 64.05 45 82 62 45.94 9 62.8
1771 701 35 61 73 35.94 45 82 62 74.05 9 14.8
2771 69 64 41 23 29.74 05 52 52 80.25 8 33.8
3771 39 44 41 03 13.74 94 52 42 96.25 8 06.8
4771 09 34 51 82 87.74 74 32 42 22.25 7 87.7
5771 88 24 51 72 37.74 64 22 42 72.25 7 59.7
6771 78 14 51 62 31.74 64 22 42 78.25 7 50.8
7771 68 14 61 52 76.74 54 22 32 33.25 7 41.8
8771 58 04 61 42 60.74 54 12 42 49.25 6 60.7
9771 38 93 61 32 99.64 44 22 22 10.35 6 32.7
Table 10. Members of the Major Council by coterie affiliation (1751-1807)
55S. ΔosiÊ and N. VekariÊ, The Factions within the Ragusan Patriciate...
-1571
.7081
8855 2872 0321 2551 97.94 6082 1541 5531 12.05 205 89.8
0871 38 83 51 32 87.54 54 32 22 22.45 6 32.7
1871 58 93 61 32 88.54 64 42 22 21.45 6 60.7
2871 58 93 51 42 88.54 64 22 42 21.45 6 60.7
3871 48 93 51 42 34.64 54 22 32 75.35 6 41.7
4871 28 93 41 52 65.74 34 12 22 44.25 5 01.6
5871 18 93 41 52 51.84 24 91 32 58.15 5 71.6
6871 18 93 31 62 51.84 24 02 22 58.15 6 14.7
7871 48 04 41 62 26.74 44 22 22 83.25 6 41.7
8871 18 73 31 42 86.54 44 02 42 23.45 6 14.7
9871 08 63 21 42 00.54 44 02 42 00.55 6 05.7
0971 97 43 11 32 40.34 54 22 32 69.65 7 68.8
1971 67 43 21 22 47.44 24 91 32 62.55 7 12.9
2971 87 53 41 12 78.44 34 02 32 31.55 8 62.01
3971 87 53 51 02 78.44 34 02 32 31.55 8 62.01
4971 58 93 91 02 88.54 64 22 42 21.45 8 14.9
5971 48 73 81 91 50.44 74 32 42 59.55 8 25.9
6971 78 83 02 81 86.34 94 62 32 23.65 9 43.01
7971 58 63 02 61 53.24 94 52 42 56.75 9 95.01
8971 29 04 42 61 84.34 25 82 42 25.65 9 87.9
9971 88 83 42 41 81.34 05 03 02 28.65 9 32.01
0081 88 83 32 51 81.34 05 23 81 28.65 8 90.9
1081 98 83 32 51 07.24 15 43 71 03.75 8 99.8
2081 19 83 32 51 67.14 35 63 71 42.85 7 96.7
3081 98 83 32 51 07.24 15 53 61 03.75 7 78.7
4081 09 93 32 61 33.34 15 63 51 76.65 6 76.6
5081 49 14 52 61 26.34 35 83 51 83.65 6 83.6
6081 49 04 32 71 55.24 45 73 71 54.75 6 83.6



















Sources for tables 10-13: Specchio del Maggior Consiglio, ser. 21.1, vol. 4 and 5.
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9. The political definition of the Salamancanists and the Sorbonnists in
the 18th century
By the end of the 17th century the original division into the counter-
Ottoman and the pragmatic group from the time of the Great Conspiracy
experienced a gradual change. At the time of the aggregation of the new
nobility the rift, in the strict sense, featured largely along the biological line,
overshadowing its political aspect. 
Apart from determining principal distinctions, accurate political charac-
terization of the Salamancanists and the Sorbonnists proves unattainable.
Although politically rooted, the rift started losing its original ideological
character on the internal political scene and turned into an unscrupulous strug-
gle for power between the two agnatic groupings. A complex difference of
opinion concerning foreign policy issues maintained though in a consider-
Graph 4. Members of the Major Council by coterie affiliation (1751-1807)
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ably modified form in conformity with the change of the political relations in
south-east Europe and the Mediterranean. We might be under an impression
that the ideologically raw political positions of the Salamancanists and the
Sorbonnists were guided by personal ambition of the leading members of
certain casate. That is why it is impossible to draw an accurate political por-
trait of the two groups. It seems that the notion of an agnatically-based polit-
ical coterie includes the basic elements of the social and political functioning
of the Salamancanists and the Sorbonnists.72 Narrow family interests were to
dominate over the political and ideological differences between the Salaman-
canists and the Sorbonnists. Thus, in line with Æarko MuljaËiÊ’s argument, a
definition of the “new” (the Sorbonnists) as politically liberal and progres-
sive and the “old” (the Salamancanists) as politically reactionary and conser-
vative, a stereotyped approach commonly found in literature, may be mis-
leading. 
10. The result of the rift: a new political paradigm
Most of the mesalliances involving the old and the new nobility date from
the period immediately after the aggregation, but during the 18th century the
conflict tended to unfold as a complex political process which introduced
essential changes into the centuries-long institutional practice of Dubrovnik.
A new political paradigm was based on unscrupulous inner-class power
struggle, which inevitably led towards a disintegration of the political sys-
tem. Although he failed to provide an acceptable definition of the new patri-
cian groups, the historian Kosto VojnoviÊ made an excellent attempt to
evaluate the significance and the aftermath of this phase of the rift: “Thus the
ancient principle of equality of all patrician families, upon which the Republic
rested over eight centuries, gave way to oligarchy. Because the new patri-
cians were restricted from holding rector’s office and at first from sitting on
the Senate as well... In that way the city was divided into two rival groups of
the Salamancanists and the Sorbonnists, hostile and animus against each
72 The term patrician agnatic group is much too general and inaccurate, while the term party,
found in some works, denotes a modern political organization. Apart from the notion of party,
Lujo VojnoviÊ tends to use the term consorterija (≈Salamankezi i sorbonezi«, DubrovaËki list
2/22 (1925): pp. 2-3), equally employed by Æarko MuljaËiÊ, although the latter decided on the
term “party” in one of his titles (≈O strankama u starom Dubrovniku«). The notion coterie puts a
stress on the “blood” criterion, covering also the unstable political area of conflicting interests, as
well as the fact that the activity of these groups lacked any form of legal framework.
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other. This dualism was the seed of the rivalry, seemingly dormant, which
would sooner or later bring poisonous fruit.”73
The form of the decisions of the Ragusan councils and the silence of the
official sources from the first decades after the aggregation limit our survey
into the political consequences of the “blood” rift.74 Despite fairly sparse
sources, certain evidence of more recent date confirms that the old nobility
grouping, which tended to inter-marry with the aggregates, operated from the
very beginning as a separate, Sorbonnist group, as opposed to the “pure-
blooded” Salamancanist group. But the consequences of the clear-cut demar-
cation between the two endogamous groups may not be traced on the polit-
ical perspective before the close of the 1750s. It was then, during the polit-
ical ferment among the patriciate, that the “new” and the “old” are being
mentioned.75 Although the first source reference to “the Salamancanists” and
“the Sorbonnists” dates from mid-1770s,76 we can assume that the terms must
73 Kosto VojnoviÊ, ≈Sudbeni ustroj republike dubrovaËke«. Rad JAZU 115 (1893): p. 3.
74 Discussions on the councils were not recorded and in formulating the final decisions the
Ragusan political elite tended to misrepresent the conflict and animosity among the members.
Administrative brevity of the conclusions conceals political dynamics in that the relations be-
tween the factions and eventual political positions of the individuals and groups on the councils
can only be gleaned from the voting results. Reading between the lines, one can hardly grasp the
crisis proportions of 1763 and 1781, on which other sources testify as serious political and agnat-
ic divisions.
75 Although Herculès, a French merchant in Dubrovnik, mentions a “pro-French and counter-
French party” in the City as early as in 1758, the first explicite reference to the political conflict
of “the new” and “the old” was made by the French consul Le Maire in his report of February 12,
1763, in which he described the course of a several-months’ conflict among the patricians. See:
Vjekoslav JelaviÊ, ≈O dubrovaËko-franceskim odnosima u god. 1756.-1776.«. Glasnik Zemaljskog
muzeja u Bosni i Hercegovini 16 (1906): pp. 518, 523-525.
76 To date, no evidence on the usage of the terms salamankezi or sorbonezi in the official
state papers can be traced. The first record pointing to the patrician groups being named after
Salamanca and Sorbonne was made by an anonym in the service of Maria Theresa during his visit
to Dalmatia and Dubrovnik in 1774 and 1775. On different names of the patrician groups, the
report reads: “I primi sono indicati dicendoli di Salamanca; gli altri i Sorbona”. (Maja Novak
Sambrailo, ≈Politika DubrovËana«. Starine JAZU 55 (1971): p. 161). The syntagm partito dei
sorbonezi MuljaËiÊ has located in a private document. It was in the letter of Kata Bassegli (a
Salamancanist) addressed to her son Tomo on May 4, 1781. In another letter of June 16, 1784,
she refers to her own group as nostro partito. Attributive use of the term Salamancanist has been
found in a letter of Alberto Fortis addressed to Miho Sorgo on June 23, 1785. Fortis describes an
Italian countess keen on her ancient title as being ”of Salamancanist orientation”, an expression
Sorgo would be familiar with. In a letter to her niece Deπa of December 9, 1786, Miho Sorgo de-
scribes a Venetian Alvisetto Mocenigo as a “wealthy Salamancanist”. Æ. MuljaËiÊ, ≈Salamankezi
i sorbonezi u Dubrovniku«: p. 161, note 1.
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have been coined earlier, probably immediately after the Great Conspiracy.
The closed political system of the Republic, along with a disproportionate
domination of the Salamancanist faction, are the main reasons why the his-
torical accounts point to the agnatic division with a certain delay. With the
growing rivalry between the patrician groups, the Sorbonnists’ aspirations
became greater, and it was then that the blood division forced itself as an
issue in Dubrovnik’s political practice. 
The institutional organization of the Republic of Dubrovnik rested upon
age-old principles of class integrity and consensus. It did not suit a new polit-
ical pattern. Electoral procedure based on centuries-old tradition, according
to which a majority of two-thirds was necessary for the election of all the
higher-ranking offices contributed to institutional stability. As a body which
created and in the main implemented the state policy, the Senate gained in
importance from the 15th century on.77 The Senate was a body of a dual
nature: a number of senators was elected by the Major Council through the
usual system of chambers, while some seats were occupied by the holders of
some highest offices (rector, members of the Minor Council, and judges).78
By rotating some seats on the Senate held ex officio and by electing new
members, the Major Council partly managed to maintain the renewal of its
composition. With a high degree of class homogeneity even the minimum
changes on the Senate prevented the oligarchy from petrifying.79
But the appearance of two strong blocks put the efficiency of the current
system to test. As the political alignment with the coteries became essential
77 Nella Lonza, ≈Izborni postupak DubrovaËke Republike«. Anali Zavoda za povijesne
znanosti HAZU u Dubrovniku 38 (2000): pp. 46-47.
78 The Senate (Consilium Rogatorum) was established in the early fourteenth century and
consisted of 20 members. The number of members fluctuated from year to year, reaching 51
member in 1447, and 61 in 1490. The Major Council elected senators for a term of twelve
months, and they could not be re-elected in the following year. The practice changed over the
years and the senators stayed in change for several years. (Kosto VojnoviÊ, ≈O dræavnom ustroj-
stvu republike DubrovaËke«. Rad JAZU 103 (1891): pp. 54-55). As the number of the patricians
dropped considerably after the 1667 earthquake, only 24 members were sitting on the Senate.
New regulations were introduced to increase the membership, and in 1704 there were 36 men, in
1713, 41, and in the period between 1731 and the fall of the Republic, there were 45 members.
Liber Croceus, ed. Branislav M. NedeljkoviÊ. [Zbornik za istoriju, jezik i knjiæevnost srpskog
naroda, III.24]. Beograd: SANU, 1997: cc. 334, 357, 363, 367.
79 N. Lonza, ≈Izborni postupak DubrovaËke Republike«: pp. 47-48; K. VojnoviÊ, ≈Sudbeni
ustroj republike dubrovaËke«: pp. 14-21.
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for the participation in government, a gradual change in the power balance
tended to alter the system. The Salamancanists proved to be particularly keen
on this idea as they were losing power and no longer distinctly outnumbered
their rivals in that they could secure domination within the frame of the old
system. Thus the struggle between coteries for the leading position on the
Senate provided a series of deep institutional reforms which, from the 1750s,
regulated the elections, functioning, and jurisdiction of the most important
governmental bodies.80
The power shift first manifested on the largest body, the Major Council,
in which the Sorbonnists were in the ascendancy (Table 10). Thus the first
step the Salamancanists resorted to in order to secure their position through
reform was directed towards redefinition of its functions. Their aim was to
strip the Major Council of its authority and unable the Sorbonnists from infil-
trating into the Senate. The electoral reforms of 1747 and 1749 marked an
essential change in the institutional frame through which the role of the
Major Council in the election of the highest office-holders was formally limit-
ed, and in practice virtually abolished. According to the new electoral laws,
the major magistrates (rector, members of the Minor Council, and the judges)
were selected only out of the members of the Senate, and a vacant seat could
only result from a member’s death or his ordination.81 Thus the Senate as a
central political institution fully incorporated and subjected major govern-
ment functions, which in the former system secured a political counter-
balance. The senators, securely ensconced in their circle, took over the most
important offices of the state, creating perfect ground for the “senators’
oligarchy”. In order to deprive the Major Council of every authority and pre-
vent the Sorbonnists from swarming into the Senate, the last of the electoral
procedures was amended: the 1749 law decreed the election of Collegio
80 In the period 1747-1801 more than 20 decisions were passed on the Major Council con-
cerning the composition, electoral procedure, quorum, and the responsibilities of the Senate in
decision-making. (Cf. Liber Croceus). In order to maintain an illusion of deep-seated traditional-
ism, the electoral changes were at first interpreted as temporary, but soon proved permanent. The
“restoration of the old system” was envoked when there were practically no conditions for it. Cf.
N. Lonza, ≈Izborni postupak DubrovaËke Republike«: pp. 46-47.
81 The law of 1747 was adopted by a majority of 60 votes to 34, and that of 1749 was passed
by a vote of 68 to 28. Liber Croceus: cc. 382, 387; N. Lonza, ≈Izborni postupak DubrovaËke Re-
publike«: pp. 46-49.
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Nuovo, whose members succeeded the deceased senators according to the
age ordering and not election. Commenting on these institutional reforms,
Nella Lonza excellently anticipated their meaning as the “Senate’s silent coup
d’état”.82 We may add a “Salamancanists’ silent coup d’état” because there is
no doubt that the reforms were initiated and carried out by the Salamancanist
majority which credited itself for scheming the Major Council into voting
against its own deprivation of authority.
11. Oligarchy: a clash among the Salamancanists
Through legal methods and the adjustment of the electoral system, the
Salamancanist coterie succeeded in securing a long-term majority on the
Senate, and with it a dominant position in the leading offices of the state
(Table 11), and thus, for a certain period at least, managed to neutralize the
numerical increase of the Sorbonnists. But the policy of closing their ranks
proved fatal for the Salamancanists, too. Over the years, an inner circle of
senators came to hold absolute power. The Salamancanists failed to evenly
distribute political influence among the casate which resulted in numerous
rivalries in the faction, to the benefit of the Sorbonnists. By the end of 1750s,
a dissatisfied Salamancanist wing, ignoring the “blood” principle, tended to
lean politically towards the Sorbonnist line. An open conflict followed at the
end of 1762 and the beginning of 1763, leading to a four-month obstruction
of the government.83
82 The Major Council retained the right to re-elect senators after their term of office. How
ever, if the re-election was denied, the motion could recurrently be put forward, forcing the
Council to finaly elect the men. N. Lonza, ≈Izborni postupak DubrovaËke Republike«: p. 47, note
166.
83 Brief accounts of older historiography on the “anarchy” and the conflict amongst the patri-
cians (Gebhardi, Engel) are based on oral tradition and are generally superficial. In his interpret-
ation of the events, Vinko ForetiÊ has made a critical compilation of the available data in litera-
ture and the narrative sources. (V. ForetiÊ, Povijest Dubrovnika II: pp. 239-247). In addition to
the references cited by ForetiÊ, for more information on the conflict see: Antoine Sorgo, Frag-
ments sur l’histoire politique et littéraire de l’ancienne republique de Raguse et sur la langue
slave. Paris: Porthman, 1839: pp. 14-16; Stefano Skurla, Ragusa - cenni storici. Zagabria, 1876:
pp. 22-23; K. VojnoviÊ, ≈Sudbeni ustroj republike dubrovaËke«: pp. 9-10; F. Serafino Razzi, La
storia di Ragusa. Dubrovnik, 1903: p. 266 (a chronological supplement by Giuseppe Gelcich); Æ.
MuljaËiÊ, ≈O strankama u starom Dubrovniku«: pp. 30-31.
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Domestic and foreign authors of the time seem to agree on the origin and
course of the 1762/3 conflict,84 pointing to the office-holders from the ranks
of the old nobility as to those responsible for the conflict. In the reconstruc-
tion of the events they focus on the arrogance of the Ragusan aristocracy and
its government as corrupt, incompetent and burdened with prejudice, which
undermined the Arcadian order of the Republic. On the other hand, all the
sources agree on the disciplined and reasonable behaviour of the citizens,
who, during the “anarchy”, attended to their regular city duties in a “perfect-
ly composed” manner, although the most important governmental institu-
tions had stopped work. 
Table 11. Representation of the Salamancanists and Sorbonnist on the Major
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84 Apart from the sources and literature cited by V. ForetiÊ, particularly the work of V. Jela-
viÊ, ≈O dubrovaËko-franceskim odnosima«: pp. 523-525, the basis of our study hereafter are the
following narrative sources: M. Novak Sambrailo, ≈Politika DubrovËana«: pp. 159-167; ≈Lje-
topis dubrovaËkog kolegija (1559-1764).«, ed. Miroslav Vanino. Vrela i prinosi 7 (1937): pp. 156-
157 (the author of this part of the annals is –uro BaπiÊ, a Ragusan Jesuit); an unfinished work of
Ivo Natali (1775-1853), Storia di Ragusa, SAD, Legacy Natali RO-177 and the unpublished an-
nals of a Ragusan Mato BaπiÊ (1737-1813), Collezione di notizie istoriche di Ragusa (the original is
kept at the Library of the Franciscan Monastery, but we have used the transcription made by
Luko PavloviÊ at SAD, Legacy don Luka PavloviÊ, RO-167, no. 54-439.
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A Ragusan annalist, Mato BaπiÊ, gives a more thorough analysis of the
reasons underlying the oligarchy. In view of the great power the Senate exer-
cised as an institution, BaπiÊ emphasizes the moral fall and incapacity of the
nobility which proved unable to spare even the supreme government body of
its ambition, interest, and hatred, acting against the ancient principle carved
by the entrance to the chamber of the major Council: Obliti privatorum pub-
lica curate (Having forgotten your private interests, take care of public
affairs). With the delay in the elections of new senators which were to follow
after a certain number of vacancies, the relations on the Senate worsened.
Through electoral schemes and agitation, the most powerful group on the
Senate managed to elect its confidants and kin. After 1749 the electoral pro-
cedure failed to observe the age ordering of the members on the Collegio
Nuovo. Some patricians were recurrently left out, their seats being filled with
other candidates following the agnatic key. In this way, the senators’ oligarchic
circle increasingly gained in strength.
The leader of the oligarchic group of the old, the “tyranny” of which on
the Senate started after the reforms 1747-1749, was Sabo Pozza (1698-1774).
His right-hand men were the seven Sorgo brothers, called Debi (or Golostraπ-
ni, i.e. the Bare Bullies), who led a large network of agnates and partisans.85
According to André Alexandre Le Maire, French consul to Dubrovnik, the
members of this group came to hold all the power and for a period of fifteen
years, through intrigue and corruption, decided on all the major political
issues. Lust for power, violence, and greed were the qualities ascribed to the
group by Le Maire, considering them enemies to the French economic and
political interests. By the end of 1762, this oligarchic group of Salamancan-
ists was rivaled by another Salamancanist faction, supported by the Sorbon-
nists. The leader of the latter group was a Salamancanist, Mato Gradi (1692-
1771), with the support of the like-minded Salamancanists, Antun Sorgo
(1693-1765), Nikola Bona (1708-1769), Rado Gozze (1693-1768), Nikola
Gozze (1698-1773), Frano Ragnina (1714-1791), Marin Sorgo (1692-1761),
85 The aggressive behaviour of Sabo Pozza and the Sorgo brothers is considered to be the
main cause of the conflict. In the reports on the “anarchy” and the literature available, the
Golostraπni brothers are not cited by name, but are usually described as a violent phenomenon
void of individual features. The group consisted of Vladislav (1683-1770), Luka (1685-1762),
Gauge (1694-1774), Junije (1698-1767), Mato (1703-1778), ©iπko (1707-1789), and Ivan (1709-
1796). The eighth brother Nikola (1696-1763) was a priest, and as such could not take active part
in the political life.
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Table 12. Casate by participation in office (1751-1807)
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Rank-
ing Ranking in the period
Casata CABOGA BERNARD son of MARIN
(1671-1753)
Casata SARACA NIKOLA son of PAVAO
(c. 1649-1712)
Casata ZAMAGNA MARTOLICA son of KRISTOFAN
(*c. 1635)
Casata GIORGI BONA MIHO son of ANTUN
(*c. 1645)
Casata MENZE KLEMENT son of IVAN
(c. 1641-1719)
Casata GHETALDI MATO son of IVAN
(c. 1665-1735)
Casata SORGO NIKOLA son of VLADISLAV 
(1717-1790)
Casata ZAMAGNA-CERVA MARTOLICA
son of PETAR (1720-1783)
Casata PROCULO STJEPAN son of BOÆO 
(c. 1654-1708)
Casata SORGO NIKOLA son of LUKA (c. 1655-1720)
Casata RAGNINA FRANO son of SABO (*c. 1635)
Casata POZZA LUCIJAN (*c. 1615)
Casata GRADI FRANO son of ©I©KO (c. 1650-1740)
Casata GOZZE NIKOLA son of BOÆO (*c. 1640)
Casata BONA IVAN son of SERAFIN (1598-1658)
Casata BONA MATO son of MARIN (1637-1708)
Casata SORGO ORSAT son of MARIN (*c. 1645)
Casata TUDISI MARIN son of FRANO (*c. 1635)
Casata BASSEGLI MARKO son of TOMA (*c. 1635)
Casata BUΔA SEKONDO son of NIKOLA (*c. 1605)
Casata CERVA MARTOLICA (*c. 1600)
Casata SORGO MARIN son of LUKA (*c. 1645)
Casata SORGO PETAR son of FRANO (c. 1663-1728)
Casata BONA LUKA son of FRANO (*c. 1630)
Casata GOZZE IVAN son of RADO (*c. 1655)
Casata GRADI JUNIJE son of MATO (1622-1667)
Casata SORGO JUNIJE son of LUKA (*c. 1615)
Casata GOZZE LUKA son of NIKOLA (*c. 1635)
Table 13. Ranking of Casate by decades (1751-1807) 
67S. ΔosiÊ and N. VekariÊ, The Factions within the Ragusan Patriciate...
















92 9 31-21 23-92 53-43 43 33-92
03 25-63 13 51-41 44-63 92-62 9-8
13 23-13 72-42 32-91 52-42 33-03 -
33-23 25-63 15-83 05-24 92 11 82-72
33-23 25-63 73-63 32-91 22-02 32-12 -
63-43 - 15-83 23-92 22-02 52 62-42
63-43 03 15-83 05-24 82-62 42 71-51
63-43 - 15-83 62-42 91 32-12 33-92
73 6 92-82 05-24 44-63 73-63 -
83 61-11 72-42 43-33 - - -
04-93 61-11 32-91 - - - -
04-93 72 72-42 23-92 - -
-
24-14 25-63 43-23 05-24 44-63 32-12 32-22
24-14 23-13 03 32-91 - - -
34 25-63 15-83 05-24 13-03 02-81 62-42
54-44 62 32-91 14-83 - - -
54-44 - - 73-63 82-62 02-81 33-92
64 25-63 15-83 43-33 44-63 04-83 9-8
74 8-7 - - - - -
84 25-63 15-83 05-24 44-63 92-62 32-22
94 61-11 - - - - -
05 81-71 - - - - -
15 25-63 15-83 05-24 82-62 04-83 -
35-25 - 15-83 14-83 - - -
35-25 53-33 15-83 05-24 44-63 - -
65-45 25-63 - - - - -
65-45 25-63 15-83 - - - -
65-45 25-63 15-83 05-24 44-63 14 -
Rank-
ing Ranking in the period
Casata GHETALDI MATO son of FRANO (*c. 1635)
Casata GOZZE LUKA son of VLADISLAV (*c. 1635)
Casata BONA IVAN son of IVAN NIKOLA (1714-1795)
Casata BOSDARI VLAHO son of MIHO (*c. 1635)
Casata GOZZE PAVAO son of VLADISLAV (*c. 1645)
Casata GOZZE RADO son of VLADISLAV (*c. 1640)
Casata GOZZE NIKOLA son of PAVAO (1727-1799)
Casata ZAMAGNA SABO son of SERAFIN (*c. 1620)
Casata BONA NIKOLA son of FRANO (*c. 1625)
Casata GOZZE NIKOLA son of LUKA 
(c. 1625-before 1671)
Casata GHETALDI-GONDOLA FRANO-AUGUSTIN
son of MATO (1743-1798)
Casata GIORGI BONDA ORSAT son of MIHO
(1730-1789)
Casata BUΔA MATO son of MARIN (1682-1760)
Casata PAULI ANDRIJA son of IVAN-PETAR 
(*c. 1630)
Casata SORGO IVAN son of MARKO (c. 1664-1736)
Casata RESTI JUNIJE (*c. 1600)
Casata CERVA JUNIJE son of GABRIJEL (*c. 1635)
Casata NATALI JAKOV son of MATO (*c. 1600)
Casata BOBALI DAMJAN son of JAKOV (*c. 1655)
Casata TUDISI STJEPAN son of VLAHO (*c. 1640)
Casata ZLATARIΔ MIHO son of DOMINIK (*c. 1605)
Casata BONDA MARIN son of JERONIM (*c. 1620)
Casata RAGNINA JUNIJE son of SABO (1723-1772)
Casata MENZE JERONIM son of IVAN (*c. 1635)
Casata CLASCI IVAN son of STJEPAN (*c. 1620)
Casata BONA MARIN son of MARIN (c. 1662-1729)
Casata GONDOLA ©I©KO son of IVAN (*c. 1630)
Casata POZZA-SORGO LUCIJAN son of NIKOLA 
(1735-1813)
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and a Sorbonnist, Mato Ghetaldi (1705-1776).86 Although the discontented
patricians stemmed from both coteries, the senators and office-holders from
the Salamancanist group, who did not support the narrower oligarchic circle
of the Sorgo brothers, represented the core. BaπiÊ states that the leaders of the
discontented group agreed but on one issue: to overthrow the oligarchy of the
seven brothers. The Sorbonnists had no direct influence on the Senate and
most of them sided with the discontented but, according to an anonymous
Austrian account, a few of the Sorbonnists were in silent favour of the oli-
garchy, hoping that opportunism would bring them a step closer to senator-
ship. By the other faction they were labeled as Sorbonnist traitors.87
A tendency towards redistribution of power once again led to the petition
for electoral and institutional reforms. During the session of November 9,
1762, Mato Gradi submitted the requests of the dissenters before the Senate:
retreat of four Sorgo members, who were to remain on the Senate but with-
out the right to vote; election by lot for the major offices in order to avoid
bribe; and the observance of the age ordering criterion in the nomination of
new senators. Although most of the patricians supported these requests, the
ruling few on the Senate rejected them. No voting took place and the session
was adjourned. The conflict escalated and in the next few days was marked
by street riots. As the Major Council did not sit in November and thus failed
to approve the magistrates for the following year, the government faced a cri-
sis. After another confrontation on St. Sylvester of 1762, a provisional agree-
ment was reached on the election of the rector and the January agenda of the
Minor Council. A succession of futile negotiations took place over the next
thirty days. The ruling minority resorted to a variety of compromising methods
in order to gain support from the reluctant members, while an armed conflict
was an alternative the dissenting group also had in mind. As the agreement
had not yet been reached by the end of January 1763, the conflict intensified,
and the government apparatus was paralyzed. A compromise was finally
86 Attached to Le Maire’s letter from 1758 is the report of Paul Herculès on the political con-
flicts in the City. Herculès writes on the counter-French oriented Salamancanist elite on the Sen-
ate, opposed by a pro-French group consisting of the patricians from both coteries. As leading
figures of the latter group he mentions Marin and Antun Sorgo, Rafo and Nikola Gozze, Mato
Ghetaldi, and Nikola Bona. V. JelaviÊ, ≈O dubrovaËko-franceskim odnosima«: p. 518.
87 M. Novak Sambrailo, ≈Politika DubrovËana«: p. 162. Anonym probably visited Dubrov-
nik in 1775. He is the first to mention the names Salamanchi and Sorboni, and in addition to the
terms “the old” and “the new” uses them to describe the events from 1762/3, confirming thus their
synonymity.
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reached after the dissenters’ threat to select the magistrates themselves, and
the Major Council met on February 28, 1763.88 Apart from the election of
new senators, the ensuing meetings witnessed an acclamation of the new
electoral system and the laws on procedure on Major Council and the Senate,
drafted by three senators particularly assigned for the task. 
In the main, the new regulations of March 5, 1763, fulfilled the dissidents’
requests. Only three members of the same family branch were allowed to
vote on the Senate and in case of the vote by special majority (strettura),
merely two of them. In order to secure a fair and a proper proceeding of the
elections, the new electoral system was based on sortition (sortizione), or a
combination of sortition and ballot. For the sake of efficiency, in certain
cases the reduction of the quorum on the Major Council was also decreed.
For the same purpose, the Senate was the sole holder of the right to authen-
tic interpretation of this law, by which the former constitutional responsibil-
ity of the proveditori (Guardians of Justice) seemed to have been ignored.89
The analysis of the casate ranking and their participation in the highest
offices of the state (senators, rectors, members of the Minor Council, and
judges) before and after the events of 1762/3 clearly shows that it was a con-
flict between the two strongest Salamancanist casate (Tables 12 and 13). 
12. A compromise between the Salamancanists: persecution of the Sorbon-
nists
The conflict stirred by the oligarchy of the Sorgo brothers and Sabo Pozza
was overcome by a new reform and a political compromise. The problem of
88 According to the accounts of Mato BaπiÊ, Mato Pozza, a “person most wise and benevo-
lent”, played the main role in resolving the conflict, using his calming influence on the leader of
the ruling oligarchy and his cousin, Sabo Pozza, as well as on his uncle Antun Sorgo, who, howe-
ver, was under the strong influence of his brother-in-law, Frano Ragnina, a fierce enemy of the
seven Sorgos. Pozza was supported by a cousin of his, a Salamancanist Nikola Bona, a most ex-
cellent lawyer, who tried to formulate a compromising legal proposition. Bona managed to talk
the Sorgo brothers into accepting the proposed solution, the reconciliation being speeded up by
the news of the outbreak of plague and the grouping of pasha’s troops in Bosnia.
89 Liber Croceus, c. 396. The most important office-holders of the Senate, judges, and
proveditori (Guardians of Justice) were elect exclusively by sortition. Being a common source of
conflict, the New Council (collegio nuovo) was abolished, and instead of it a similar body was
introduced - Additional Council (Giunta del collegio) - consisting of 43 members who were to
fill the vacant seats on the Senate according to the age order.
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class rift, however, and the undermining effect it had on the Republic’s insti-
tutional system were far too deep to be resolved through palliative meas-
ures.90 The sortition system did, in fact, limit electoral manipulations, but the
Senate still remained a closed body, and the members of the Minor council,
judges, and rectors continued to be elected from the Senate’s circle only. 
Once again the compromise of 1763 provided conditions for the breaking
of the short-term coalition of some Salamancanists and the Sorbonnists,
marking the beginning of a new phase in the conflict between coteries, as
confirmed by Prévost, French consul to Dubrovnik in 1770. During his
absence in the first half of the year, a new conflict took place. As victims of
Salamancanist oppression, a considerable number of young Sorbonnists fled
to Italy, especially Ancona, or the Island of KorËula, which was under the
Venetian rule. The membership of the Major Council dropped down by a
quarter. The Salamancanists concealed the true reason underlying the
Sorbonnist exodus, justifying their departure by their need for education
abroad. All the twelve rectors came from the Salamancanist circle, which
occurred only once in the latter half of the 18th century, in 1774. In Prévost’s
words, the citizens were distrustful and deeply concerned for the future of the
state.91
An anonymous envoy in the service of Maria Theresia reports that after
the death of Mato Gradi (1692-1771) the Salamancanist influence weakened.
A worthy successor could not be found, although the young and able Miho
Sorgo (1739-1796) was a serious candidate. The advocates of the former oli-
garchy came back on the scene and in the lead, but because of the biological
drop, internal conflicts, and financial crisis, the Salamancanist influence was
weakening.92 The Salamancanist superiority, however, marked the last serious
conflict in 1781, which was accompanied by street riots. The Sorbonnists
overestimated their own strength and their own disunity led them to a defeat.
The Salamancanist majority on the Senate organized an investigation and by
a majority vote of 19 to 10 decided to punish severely the Sorbonnist dis-
senters: Brnjo Caboga (1739-1814) was sentenced to a one-year exile and a
90 In the closing chapter on “anarchy” in 1762/3, Mato BaπiÊ critically remarks that the aris-
tocratic order was destroyed by the patricians themselves, of which he had no intention to discuss
further. In his opinion, all the social classes in the Republic should work together on the restor-
ation of the former government system or some other most convenient form.
91 V. JelaviÊ, ≈O dubrovaËko-franceskim odnosima«: p. 543. 
92 M. Novak Sambrailo, ≈Politika DubrovËana.«: p. 165.
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two-year loss of patrician privileges; Maro Zamagna (1737-1808) was deprived
of patrician privileges for a period of six months. The same sentence but with
a different duration was passed onto Frano-Augustin Ghetaldi-Gondola
(1743-1798) - two months, and Dæivo Caboga (1743-1826) - a month. Frano-
Jero Bona (1729-1802) was deprived of honours to a period of three years,
and excluded from election to the Senate for a period of ten years. A Salaman-
canist, Mato Pozza (1727-1802), was acquitted. According to the accounts of
the noblewoman Kata Bassegli, the most notorious and extravagant among
the Salamancanists of the day was a certain Sekondo Bucchia (1756-1807),
whose intimidating actions against the Sorbonnists culminated in an episode
in which Miho-Filip Bona (1757-1825), in fear of assault, barricaded himself
inside his Gruæ summer residence together with the body-guards.93
13. The disintegration of the coteries
The news on the rift within the Ragusan patriciate, permeated with an
anachronistic policy of “blood” division, spread throughout Europe, received
with a sneer in the Enlightenment circles. “Would you like me tell you of the
current world, starting off with the Chinese emperor to the warring parties in
Dubrovnik?”, wrote Voltaire in his Dialogue.94 But a perspective from the
outside did not appease the political struggle. After the Salamancanists’
Pyrrhic victory, their hegemony started to show the first signs of weakening,
the proof of which was the first election of the newly ennobled men to the
highest offices: Andrija Pauli (1697-1783) was elected senator in 1783, and
even rector in 1786, while Miho Pauli (1716-1792) was elected member of
the Minor Council.95
The weakening or the Salamancanists’ political position proceeded with-
out any particular act of pressure on the Sorbonnist behalf. Namely, in 1783
it became apparent that the brothers Lukπa (1734-1789) and Miho Sorgo
(1739-1796) consorted with the Austrian court. Their intent may have been
to use Austria in reinforcing their own position in the City, under certain con-
cessions. A small patrician group flocked around the brothers with an aim to
93 S. Razzi, La storia di Ragusa: p. 268; Æ. MuljaËiÊ, ≈O strankama u starom Dubrovniku«:
pp. 33-34.
94 Ivan StojanoviÊ, Povijest DubrovaËke Republike. Dubrovnik, 1903: p. 190; On Enlighten-
ment perception of the Ragusan government see also: Æarko MuljaËiÊ, ≈Tko je dubrovaËki Mon-
tesquieu?«. Zbornik radova Filozofskog fakulteta u Zagrebu 3 (1955): pp. 183-191.
95 Specchio, 18th c., f. 207v, 42 (SAD).
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carry out certain political reforms based on the ideas of the Enlightenment.
They also counted on the Sorbonnist support. Ivo Natali characterized their
policy as an attempt to introduce tyranny, but the fate of Lukπa Sorgo and the
activity of his brother Miho show that Natali’s criticism was far too harsh.96
Due to strong resistance within the ranks of the patricians, the brothers faced
a failure. Further political division of the Salamancanists seemed inevitable.
The followers of the Sorgo brothers, gathered around the learned Tomo Bas-
segli and Dæono Resti, were bending their position towards the Sorbonnists,
ignoring the “blood” criterion.97 The spirit of Enlightenment, conflicts in the
Mediterranean area, and the revolutionary movements in France mirrored
onto the political conditions in Dubrovnik. New forms of political coalition
emerge and the “blood” criterion no longer features as the matrix of the polit-
ical conflict, although its biological substance remains relevant until the fall
of the Republic.
The scandal with the Sorgo brothers coincided with the new electoral and
institutional reforms at the beginning of 1783. The weakened Salamancanists
tried to convince the legislative body to revive the old electoral system by
means of chambers for all the highest offices.98 Election by ballots was aban-
doned with proclaiming “the restoration of the original order”, and the Major
Council restored its electoral authority. Giunta del Collegio (Additional
Collegium) was also abolished, and new senators were selected the old way.
But the old electoral procedure could not bring back the institutional stabil-
96 It is more likely that the Sorgo brothers and their affiliates advocated for moderate En-
lightenment reforms and “patriotism” which implied the rejection of agnatic coteries when public
affairs were at stake. Although the views of the Sorgo brothers were permeated with Enlighten-
ment thought, the evidence on their political activity in that direction is sparse. The diary entries
of Lukπa Sorgo during his Vienna days in 1780/1 (Memoriae, vol. 145, SAD), do not reveal any
particular political goals, apart from the usual diplomatic practice aimed at the protection of the
Ragusan interests. A failure in the political life marked the retirement and a tragic end of Lukπa
Sorgo. In 1785 Miho Sorgo left for Italy. Upon his return to Dubrovnik, he devoted himself en-
tirely to literary and cultural work. Cf. Æ. MuljaËiÊ, ≈O strankama u starom Dubrovniku«: p. 32;
Æarko MuljaËiÊ, ≈Dva priloga povijesti dubrovaËkih akademija«. Radovi Instituta JAZU u Zadru
4-5 (1959): pp. 319-340.
97 The correspondence of Sorgo’s nephew, Tomo Bassegli, with his mother Kata confirms the
existence of the rift among the weakened Salamancanists in the early 1790s. Tomo’s marriage
with a foreigner in 1786 and the complaints concerning his diplomatic service with Leopold II
contributed to the Bassegli’s departure from the extreme Salamancanists. Æ. MuljaËiÊ, ≈O stran-
kama u starom Dubrovniku«: pp. 36-38.
98 Liber Croceus, c. 425. On this occasion, too, the Senate’s exclusive right to interpretation
was confirmed.
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ity and the political unity of long before. Moreover, the Senate continued to
function as a closed body due to the class rift and numerous factions within
the coteries themselves. The once practiced principle of the senatorial elec-
tions, which implied a greater number of candidates and faster circulation of
the membership, was not restored. In practice, however, it did not make
much difference as to how the leading offices were filled (sortition or elec-
tion), because the number of the patricians who were age-eligible to enter the
Senate and hold the most important offices fell well below the necessary pool
(Table 10).
Although by the mid-1770s the Sorbonnists already outnumbered their
opponents and retained this position in the 1790s, the entire patriciate was
subject to a negative demographic trend, which proved to have a most sooth-
ing effect upon their antagonism. The electoral procedure from 1783 was
soon abandoned, and the law of 1791 reintroduced lot, i. e. a combination of
sortition and election for all offices. This was the last in line of the numerous
electoral changes, which, with modest results, aimed to determine the bal-
ance of power among the patriciate. The sortition secured the Salamancanist
minority to remain on certain posts. Only a third of the votes in the Major
Council was necessary for the confirmation of the current senators, while the
new ones were selected in accordance with the age ordering only, requiring
a mere quarter of the votes of the same body. This regulation was of vital
importance because of the biological implosion of the ruling class.99 The
Senate had the exclusive right to the interpretation of these regulations.100 The
number of active members of the Major Council was experiencing a constant
decline and fell below the number of 45 senator’s posts, so that the elections
became a sheer formality, especially having in mind the age criterion. Thus
in the electoral sense, the Major Council became practically redundant.  
Under the pressure of events, the agnatically- based political struggle for
the dominant position on the Senate began to lack pace, and virtually died out
in the last fifteen years of the Republic. It was replaced by new coalition
forms, which, similar to the rift two centuries earlier, had their roots in for-
eign policy issues and the affiliation of certain patrician groups towards par-
99 Strict endogamy was still practised by the Ragusan elite despite the crisis. On June 17,
1791, the Major Council passed a law which allowed bethrotal and marriage between spouses of
the first degree of consanguinity with the permission of the Holy See. Liber Croceus, c. 441.
100 Liber Croceus, c. 440.
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ticular European powers. Although the ancient “blood” distinction was still
in effect, dynamic processes in Europe, accompanied by post-revolutionary
wars and Napoleon’s campaigns had a strong influence upon the shaping of
new political groups within the Ragusan patriciate. Therefore, by the end of
the 18th century a Francophile, Austrophile, and Russophile factions made
their appearance. In addition to these, conditionally characterized by their
foreign orientation, which, at the dawn of the 19th century, Mato Pozza
termed as Monarchici, there were also Marittimi and Oligarchici.101 Appar-
ently, this was a new political pattern among the patriciate, tending to mirror
their position in the economic stratification in course.102 Each group had both
Salamancanist and Sorbonnist partisans, proving that the agnatic division
had lost its political significance. The group Pozza refers to as Monarchici
bore hardly any specific ideological features, and their political affiliation to
the regimes of the foreign states was completely vague. Although Pozza clas-
sified them under a common group of royalists, there is ground to believe
that their support was more of a traditional tendency towards one of the great
powers, aimed at reinforcing the international position of the Republic of
Dubrovnik. The other two groups, however, did feature certain ideological
attributes. Marittimi most likely represented the business-minded liberal
nobility which invested into shipping industry. This group tended to coordin-
ate the state administration with its own business profit. The development of
shipping industry in the late 18th century contributed to the growing number
of ship and cargo share- and co-share-holders (karatisti) among the patri-
cians. Thus the Marittimi were becoming more influential, sharing the same
interests with wealthy citizens who owned most of the commercial fleet and
who pioneered the new development of the maritime commerce. As most of
the Republic’s budget came from shipping, a group of impoverished nobles
to whom the sinecures represented a valuable source of income, crossed the
class barrier and tended to cooperate with the citizens. A group referred to as
Oligarhici probably consisted of the conservative members of the landed
aristocracy, which rejected the necessary reforms of the antiquated class sys-
tem. Economically inferior, these entratisti contributed considerably to the
maintenance of the feudal real estate, and in order to hinder the social changes,
101 Vid V. VukasoviÊ, ≈Biljeπke o strankama u Dubrovniku poËetkom XIX. vijeka«. Sr 7/1-
5 (1908): pp. 108-110.
102 Cf. Stjepan ΔosiÊ, Dubrovnik nakon pada Republike. Dubrovnik: Zavod za povijesne zna-
nosti HAZU, 1999: pp. 18-19.
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they supported the mercantile laws and other restrictive legislations concerning
shipping and commerce. Seven Sorbonnists were among them, too, testify-
ing once again to the fact that their social attitudes were not differentia speci-
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Table 14. New political groupings among the Ragusan patriciate preceding the
fall of the Republic of Dubrovnik
Source: Vid VuletiÊ-VukasoviÊ, ≈Biljeπke o strankama u Dubrovniku poËetkom
XIX. vijeku.√ Sr 7/1-5 (1908): pp. 108-110: Lujo VojnoviÊ, Pad Dubrovnika.
Knjiga druga (1807.-1815.). Zagreb, 1908: pp. 15-418.
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When the Sorbonnists were finally in position to take the lead, the coteries
disintegrated. The entire 18th century was marked by the Salamancanist
superiority, the Sorbonnists being completely neutralized and politically dis-
united. The history of this conflict shows the Salamancanists’ profound
determination to dominate. When the Salamancanists were numerically su-
perior, they ruled by the power of vote. When their numerical superiority
started to decline, they secured the continuity of their rule through adapting
the electoral system to their needs. Time-consuming and weary, the struggle
for domination over the Sorbonnists led the Salamancanists to their own end
as well. When even the institutional measures became insufficient to Sala-
mancanists for securing political domination, the Sorbonnists were far too
impotent to take advantage of the situation. The Salamancanist majority
maintained its superior position only because the “rival party had more fools
than the former”, so bluntly put by Kata Bassegli, a contemporary Salaman-
canist observer.103 With the dawn of the 19th century, the two patrician coteries
crumbled away together with their state.
The disintegration of the coteries equally reflected on the reproductive
level. With the fall of the Republic of Dubrovnik the still-living Salaman-
canists and Sorbonnists tend to abandon endogamy by marrying outsiders of
foreign or common origin. The last of the “pure-blooded” patricians, the
paragon of patriciate’s identity, was Nikola (Nikπa) Gradi (1825-1894).104
14. Patrician patriotism: the last remaining relic of class unity 
The new ideas of the Enlightenment and rationalism could not stir the
social and governmental model of the Republic of Dubrovnik, which, until
the very last moment, remained deeply entrenched in the frames of the
ancien regime. But the exhausting patrician conflict deformed the govern-
ment pattern, causing delays in decision-making and reluctance in their
implementation. Apart from Napoleon’s military campaign, that was the
main reason underlying the fall of the Republic. Despite the fact that in the
last decades of the independence the patrician disintegration, manifested in a
variety of forms, reached a climax, the Ragusan patriciate never gave up on
the good old republican patriotism. None of the agnatically-based political or
103 Æ. MuljaËiÊ, ≈O strankama u starom Dubrovniku«: p. 36.
104 Milan Reπetar, ≈Posljednji dubrovaËki vlastelin«. DubrovaËki list 2/25 (1925): pp. 1-2. 
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pressure groups of the patriciate under inquiry ever worked against the
Republic’s independence, or conversely, to the benefit of its subjugation by
any of the great European powers. The conflicts among the patricians most
commonly developed from the agnatic or personal disagreements on inter-
national issues and their assessment of the potential political allies of the
Republic. Occasional ideological differences between them were merely a
reflection of the external political affairs. Ambitions for internal changes on
the institutional and social level, influenced by the ideas of the En-
lightenment, translated into propositions for moderate reforms and a mild
shift along the mainstream of the current system. As in the case of the brothers
Sorgo and Tomo Bassegli, these efforts got caught in the closely-knit net-
work of the agnatic and political interests.105 The divisive pattern penetrated
into all the segments of the antiquated institutional apparatus of the Republic,
which, once dichotomized, virtually collapsed. In practice, the rift was con-
ceived as a prime political fact, because of which every initiative directed
towards patrician unity and redistribution of power was untenable. Political
disunity reflected on the foreign policy as well. The Great Conspiracy started
with the most radical effort ever to shift the focus of foreign policy. It resulted,
however, in an inner-class agnatic conflict, the political contents of the
Conspiracy featuring as a mere setting. The policy of confrontation gave way
to consensus only in the time periods of the most direct threat to the
Republic. 
Ragusan patriotism remained the only identity feature all the patricians
shared. Its contents, however, cannot compare to the feeling of local patriot-
ism shared by part of the citizenry and rural population. Patrician patriotism
was based on the idea of corporate government, with the Republic as a war-
rant of their aristocratic status. In the form of identity based on tradition,
patrician patriotism survived even the most challenging political crises
Dubrovnik experienced after French occupation and in the first years of the
Austrian rule. Irrespective of the agnatic and political identity, most patri-
cians were ready to make supreme sacrifice for the restoration of the state.
Attempts to consolidate the patriciate marked the period of French occupa-
tion, when, by the end of 1813, under the leadership of Vlaho Caboga, the
people of Dubrovnik rose against the French. According to Ivo Natali’s own
105 Cfr. Ivo Banac, ≈Tomo BaseljiÊ i pitanje dubrovaËkih “FranËeza”«, in: Miljenko ForetiÊ
(ed.), DubrovaËka Republika i Francuska revolucija. Dubrovnik: Matica hrvatska, 1996: pp. 61-70.
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testimony, the patriciate was exclusively guided by the idea of restoring the
old regime and ignored the political reforms aimed at mitigating class differ-
ences.106 A breath of fresh patriotism remained but a class category, an emo-
tional relic of a long lost political harmony and a last-ditch attempt of the
patriciate to conserve its identity after their state had become a thing of the
past. 
15. Conclusion
As the process under study covers a wide chronological as well as social
range, many aspects of the division of the Ragusan patriciate have remained
beyond the scope of this article. Our primary aim was to identify the prob-
lem, provide an analysis of the most crucial moments and reconstruct its
development in outline. Further research should be based on a most accurate
reconstruction of agnatic ties between the Ragusan patricians from the end of
the sixteenth century to the period of aggregation in the 1660s. These results
should be compared to the representation of certain families and casate in the
inner circle of government. Future research should also explain the origin
and the symbolic meaning of the terms Salamancanists (salamankezi) and
Sorbonnists (sorbonezi) and should further analyze their shifting political
and general positions over a century and a half. Also, this article has not
highlighted the function of the Jesuits who apparently played a significant
role in the division of the Ragusan patriciate. A welcome light should be shed
on the political activity of some distinguished noble heads from both fac-
tions, etc. 
The principle of consensus, typical for the acting of Ragusan patrician
body, was incorporated into the laws and institutions of the Republic. This
principle, however, melted away with the increasing rivalries between the
noble families, leading eventually to a serious conflict between patrician fac-
tions and a change in the political pattern. The roots of the division should be
sought in the different political positions towards the protagonists of the
Great Conspiracy of 1611/12. 
Banished after an alleged love affair, Jakov Giorgi and Jakov Resti plot-
ted with Charles Emmanuel I, duke of Savoy, against the Ottomans in an
attempt to involve the Republic of Dubrovnik as well. By September 1612
106 S. ΔosiÊ, Dubrovnik nakon pada Republike: pp. 99-116.
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they were arrested, and awaited the capital execution. The sentence, how-
ever, caused quite a stir among the Ragusan patricians. What followed was a
theatrical display of agnatic solidarity. Instead of death, the sentenced “counter-
Ottoman” oriented conspirators won a political victory over the pragmatic
faction of the “Republican loyalists”. Not only was their punishment miti-
gated but the conspirators were even encouraged to escape. This incident
polarized the nobility, giving way to a rift between the conspirators’ kin and
the prosecutors, who eventually exchanged roles: the traitors were acclaimed
heroes and the prosecutors labeled as hangmen. Many patricians, initially
neutral, were to join the party which booked a social victory. A strong agnat-
ic network gathered around the conspirators, and formed a faction called “the
Salamancanists”, becoming fully determined after the aggregation of the new
nobility. This faction played a dominant role in Dubrovnik in the forthcom-
ing century and a half, while an inferior position was reserved for the so-
called “Sorbonnists”, with whom the new nobility later coalesced. 
Conflicts between the two closed groups continued well into the eigh-
teenth century. Their unscrupulous struggle for power reshaped the long-
established model of political behaviour. The prior political stability was
based on the traditional electoral procedure and balance among the highest
government bodies, but from the latter half of the eighteenth century the anti-
quated institutional pattern could no longer meet the needs of the new polit-
ical reality which was marked by intense internal conflicts. Although they
played the major role in the new framework, the Salamancanists were doomed
to extinction because of their uncommonly strict endogamous practice. Each
mesalliance directly undermined their group and thus aided their opponents.
By the 1770s the Sorbonnists outnumbered them. Despite this shift in number,
the Salamancanists still managed to neutralize the Sorbonnists by destroying
their political unity. Being over-represented on the major government bodies,
the Salamancanists ruled by the power of vote. Once their majority was
brought into question,  they resorted to the reform of the electoral system and
thus maintained power. The long-drawn-out struggle for power with the
Sorbonnists led the Salamancanist faction to its own end. When the latter
were no longer able to secure the leading position through institutional
devices, the Sorbonnists were far too impotent to stand at the wheel. With the
dawn of the nineteenth century the exhausted patrician factions crumbled
away together with their state.
